## 1AC

### Contention One is Warming

#### The best science proves it’s anthropogenic

Muller, 2012 [Richard, professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former MacArthur Foundation fellow, “The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic”, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?pagewanted=all]

CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following an intensive research effort involving a dozen scientists, I concluded that global warming was real and that the prior estimates of the rate of warming were correct. I’m now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely the cause. My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature project, which I founded with my daughter Elizabeth. Our results show that the average temperature of the earth’s land has risen by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years. Moreover, it appears likely that essentially all of this increase results from the human emission of greenhouse gases. These findings are stronger than those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], the United Nations group that defines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C. concluded only that most of the warming of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be natural. Our Berkeley Earth approach used sophisticated statistical methods developed largely by our lead scientist, Robert Rohde, which allowed us to determine earth land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases from urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and from human intervention and data adjustment (our work is completely automated and hands-off). In our papers we demonstrate that none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautiful sunsets and cool the earth’s surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to El Niño and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the “flattening” of the recent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has caused the gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? We tried fitting the shape to simple math functions (exponentials, polynomials), to solar activity and even to rising functions like world population. By far the best match was to the record of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice.

#### Fossil fuels are key

Vertessy and Clark3-13**-**2012[Rob, Acting Director of Australian Bureau of Meteorology, and Megan, Chief Executive Officer at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, “State of the Climate 2012”, <http://theconversation.edu.au/state-of-the-climate-2012-5831>]

Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions account for about 60% of the effect from anthropogenic greenhouse gases on the earth’s energy balance over the past 250 years. These global CO2 emissions are mostly from fossil fuels (more than 85%), land use change, mainly associated with tropical deforestation (less than 10%), and cement production and other industrial processes (about 4%). Australia contributes about 1.3% of the global CO2 emissions. Energy generation continues to climb and is dominated by fossil fuels – suggesting emissions will grow for some time yet. CO2 levels are rising in the atmosphere and ocean. About 50% of the amount of CO2 emitted from fossil fuels, industry, and changes in land-use, stays in the atmosphere. The remainder is taken up by the ocean and land vegetation, in roughly equal parts. The extra carbon dioxide absorbed by the oceans is estimated to have caused about a 30% increase in the level of ocean acidity since pre-industrial times. The sources of the CO2 increase in the atmosphere can be identified from studies of the isotopic composition of atmospheric CO2 and from oxygen (O2) concentration trends in the atmosphere. The observed trends in the isotopic (13C, 14C) composition of CO2 in the atmosphere and the decrease in the concentration of atmospheric O2 confirm that the dominant cause of the observed CO2 increase is the combustion of fossil fuels.

#### 4 degree warming is inevitable with current carbon usage trends – emissions must be reduced

Potsdam Institute, 2012 (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, “Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided”, A report for the World Bank, November, http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn\_Down\_the\_heat\_Why\_a\_4\_degree\_centrigrade\_warmer\_world\_must\_be\_avoided.pdf)

The emission pledges made at the climate conventions in Copenhagen and Cancun, if fully met, place the world on a trajectory for a global mean warming of well over 3°C. Even if these pledges are fully implemented there is still about a 20 percent chance of exceeding 4°C in 2100.10 If these pledges are not met then there is a much higher likelihood—more than 40 percent—of warming exceeding 4°C by 2100, and a 10 percent possibility of this occurring already by the 2070s, assuming emissions follow the medium business-as-usual reference pathway. On a higher fossil fuel intensive business-as-usual pathway, such as the IPCC SRESA1FI, warming exceeds 4°C earlier in the 21st century. It is important to note, however, that such a level of warming can still be avoided. There are technically and economically feasible emission pathways that could still limit warming to 2°C or below in the 21st century. To illustrate a possible pathway to warming of 4°C or more, Figure 22 uses the highest SRES scenario, SRESA1FI, and compares it to other, lower scenarios. SRESA1FI is a fossil-fuel intensive, high economic growth scenario that would very likely cause mean the global temperature to exceed a 4°C increase above preindustrial temperatures. Most striking in Figure 22 is the large gap between the projections by 2100 of current emissions reduction pledges and the (lower) emissions scenarios needed to limit warming to 1.5–2°C above pre-industrial levels. This large range in the climate change implications of the emission scenarios by 2100 is important in its own right, but it also sets the stage for an even wider divergence in the changes that would follow over the subsequent centuries, given the long response times of the climate system, including the carbon cycle and climate system components that contribute to sea-level rise. The scenarios presented in Figure 22 indicate the likely onset time for warming of 4°C or more. It can be seen that most of the scenarios remain fairly close together for the next few decades of the 21st century. By the 2050s, however, there are substantial differences among the changes in temperature projected for the different scenarios. In the highest scenario shown here (SRES A1FI), the median estimate (50 percent chance) of warming reaches 4°C by the 2080s, with a smaller probability of 10 percent of exceeding this level by the 2060s. Others have reached similar conclusions (Betts et al. 2011). Thus, even if the policy pledges from climate convention in Copenhagen and Cancun are fully implemented, there is still a chance of exceeding 4°C in 2100. If the pledges are not met and present carbon intensity trends continue, then the higher emissions scenarios shown in Figure 22 become more likely, raising the probability of reaching 4°C global mean warming by the last quarter of this century. Figure 23 shows a probabilistic picture of the regional patterns of change in temperature and precipitation for the lowest and highest RCP scenarios for the AR4 generation of AOGCMS. Patterns are broadly consistent between high and low scenarios. The high latitudes tend to warm substantially more than the global mean. RCP8.5, the highest of the new IPCC AR5 RCP scenarios, can be used to explore the regional implications of a 4°C or warmer world. For this report, results for RCP8.5 (Moss et al. 2010) from the new IPCC AR5 CMIP5 (Coupled Model Intercomparison Project; Taylor, Stouffer, & Meehl 2012) climate projections have been analyzed. Figure 24 shows the full range of increase of global mean temperature over the 21st century, relative to the 1980–2000 period from 24 models driven by the RCP8.5 scenario, with those eight models highlighted that produce a mean warming of 4–5°C above preindustrial temperatures averaged over the period 2080–2100. In terms of regional changes, the models agree that the most pronounced warming (between 4°C and 10°C) is likely to occur over land. During the boreal winter, a strong “arctic amplification” effect is projected, resulting in temperature anomalies of over 10°C in the Arctic region. The subtropical region consisting of the Mediterranean, northern Africa and the Middle East and the contiguous United States is likely to see a monthly summer temperature rise of more than 6°C.

#### Not too late – every reduction key

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We're not yet committed to surpassing 2°C global warming, but as Watson noted, we are quickly running out of time to realistically give ourselves a chance to stay below that 'danger limit'. However, 2°C is not a do-or-die threshold. Every bit of CO2 emissions we can reduce means that much avoided future warming, which means that much avoided climate change impacts. As Lonnie Thompson noted, the more global warming we manage to mitigate, the less adaption and suffering we will be forced to cope with in the future. Realistically, based on the current political climate (which we will explore in another post next week), limiting global warming to 2°C is probably the best we can do. However, there is a big difference between 2°C and 3°C, between 3°C and 4°C, and anything greater than 4°C can probably accurately be described as catastrophic, since various tipping points are expected to be triggered at this level. Right now, we are on track for the catastrophic consequences (widespread coral mortality, mass extinctions, hundreds of millions of people adversely impacted by droughts, floods, heat waves, etc.). But we're not stuck on that track just yet, and we need to move ourselves as far off of it as possible by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions as soon and as much as possible. There are of course many people who believe that the planet will not warm as much, or that the impacts of the associated climate change will be as bad as the body of scientific evidence suggests. That is certainly a possiblity, and we very much hope that their optimistic view is correct. However, what we have presented here is the best summary of scientific evidence available, and it paints a very bleak picture if we fail to rapidly reduce our greenhouse gas emissions. If we continue forward on our current path, catastrophe is not just a possible outcome, it is the most probable outcome. And an intelligent risk management approach would involve taking steps to prevent a catastrophic scenario if it were a mere possibility, let alone the most probable outcome. This is especially true since the most important component of the solution - carbon pricing - can be implemented at a relatively low cost, and a far lower cost than trying to adapt to the climate change consequences we have discussed here (Figure 4).

#### Three Impacts---

#### Agriculture – 4 degrees trumps CO2 benefits

Potsdam Institute, 2012 (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, “Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided”, A report for the World Bank, November, http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn\_Down\_the\_heat\_Why\_a\_4\_degree\_centrigrade\_warmer\_world\_must\_be\_avoided.pdf)

The overall conclusions of IPCC AR4 concerning food production and agriculture included the following: • Crop productivity is projected to increase slightly at mid- to high latitudes for local mean temperature increases of up to 1 to 3°C depending on the crop, and then decrease beyond that in some regions (medium confidence) {WGII 5.4, SPM}. • At lower latitudes, especially in seasonally dry and tropical regions, crop productivity is projected to decrease for even small local temperature increases (1 to 2°C) which would increase the risk of hunger (medium confidence) {WGII 5.4, SPM}. • Globally, the potential for food production is projected to increase with increases in local average temperature over a range of 1 to 3°C, but above this it is projected to decrease (medium confidence) {WGII 5.4, 5.5, SPM}. These findings clearly indicate a growing risk for low-latitude regions at quite low levels of temperature increase and a growing risk for systemic global problems above a warming of a few degrees Celsius. While a comprehensive review of literature is forthcoming in the IPCC AR5, the snapshot overview of recent scientific literature provided here illustrates that the concerns identified in the AR4 are confirmed by recent literature and in important cases extended. In particular, impacts of extreme heat waves deserve mention here for observed agricultural impacts (see also Chapter 2). This chapter will focus on the latest findings regarding possible limits and risks to large-scale agriculture production because of climate change, summarizing recent studies relevant to this risk assessment, including at high levels of global warming approaching 4°C. In particular, it will deliberately highlight important findings that point to the risks of assuming a forward projection of historical trends. Projections for food and agriculture over the 21st century indicate substantial challenges irrespective of climate change. As early as 2050, the world’s population is expected to reach about 9 billion people (Lutz and Samir 2010) and demand for food is expected to increase accordingly. Based on the observed relationship between per capita GDP and per capita demand for crop calories (human consumption, feed crops, fish production and losses during food production), Tilman et al. (2011) project a global increase in the demand for crops by about 100 percent from 2005 to 2050. Other estimates for the same period project a 70 percent increase of demand (Alexandratos 2009). Several projections suggest that global cereal and livestock production may need to increase by between 60 and 100 percent to 2050, depending on the warming scenario (Thornton et al. 2011). The historical context can on the one hand provide reassurance that despite growing population, food production has been able to increase to keep pace with demand and that despite occasional fluctuations, food prices generally stabilize or decrease in real terms (Godfray, Crute, et al. 2010). Increases in food production have mainly been driven by more efficient use of land, rather than by the extension of arable land, with the former more widespread in rich countries and the latter tending to be practiced in poor countries (Tilman et al. 2011). While grain production has more than doubled, the area of land used for arable agriculture has only increased by approximately 9 percent (Godfray, Beddington, et al. 2010). However, although the expansion of agricultural production has proved possible through technological innovation and improved water-use efficiency, observation and analysis point to a significant level of vulnerability of food production and prices to the consequences of climate change, extreme weather, and underlying social and economic development trends. There are some indications that climate change may reduce arable land in low-latitude regions, with reductions most pronounced in Africa, Latin America, and India (Zhang and Cai 2011). For example, flooding of agricultural land is also expected to severely impact crop yields in the future: 10.7 percent of South Asia´s agricultural land is projected to be exposed to inundation, accompanied by a 10 percent intensification of storm surges, with 1 m sea-level rise (Lange et al. 2010). Given the competition for land that may be used for other human activities (for example, urbanization and biofuel production), which can be expected to increase as climate change places pressure on scarce resources, it is likely that the main increase in production will have to be managed by an intensification of agriculture on the same—or possibly even reduced—amount of land (Godfray, Beddington et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2010). Declines in nutrient availability (for example, phosphorus), as well as the spread in pests and weeds, could further limit the increase of agricultural productivity. Geographical shifts in production patterns resulting from the effects of global warming could further escalate distributional issues in the future. While this will not be taken into consideration here, it illustrates the plethora of factors to take into account when thinking of challenges to promoting food security in a warming world. New results published since 2007 point to a more rapidly escalating risk of crop yield reductions associated with warming than previously predicted (Schlenker and Lobell 2010; Schlenker and Roberts 2009). In the period since 1980, patterns of global crop production have presented significant indications of an adverse effect resulting from climate trends and variability, with maize declining by 3.8 percent and wheat production by 5.5 percent compared to a case without climate trends. A significant portion of increases in crop yields from technology, CO2 fertilization, and other changes may have been offset by climate trends in some countries (Lobell et al. 2011). This indication alone casts some doubt on future projections based on earlier crop models. In relation to the projected effects of climate change three interrelated factors are important: temperature-induced effect, precipitation-induced effect, and the CO2 -fertilization effect. The following discussion will focus only on these biophysical factors. Other factors that can damage crops, for example, the elevated levels of tropospheric ozone (van Groenigen et al. 2012), fall outside the scope of this report and will not be addressed. Largely beyond the scope of this report are the far-reaching and uneven adverse implications for poverty in many regions arising from the macroeconomic consequences of shocks to global agricultural production from climate change. It is necessary to stress here that even where overall food production is not reduced or is even increased with low levels of warming, distributional issues mean that food security will remain a precarious matter or worsen as different regions are impacted differently and food security is further challenged by a multitude of nonclimatic factors.

#### Biodiversity – 4 degrees overwhelms resilience and adaptation – extinction

Potsdam Institute, 2012 (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, “Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided”, A report for the World Bank, November, http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn\_Down\_the\_heat\_Why\_a\_4\_degree\_centrigrade\_warmer\_world\_must\_be\_avoided.pdf)

Ecosystems and their species provide a range of important goods and services for human society. These include water, food, cultural and other values. In the AR4 an assessment of climate change effects on ecosystems and their services found the following: • If greenhouse gas emissions and other stresses continue at or above current rates, the resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded by an unprecedented combination of change in climate, associated disturbances (for example, flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, and ocean acidification) and other stressors (global change drivers) including land use change, pollution and over-exploitation of resources. • Approximately 20 to 30 percent of plant and animal species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of extinction, if increases in global average temperature exceed of 2–3° above preindustrial levels. • For increases in global average temperature exceeding 2 to 3° above preindustrial levels and in concomitant atmospheric CO2 concentrations, major changes are projected in ecosystem structure and function, species’ ecological interactions and shifts in species’ geographical ranges, with predominantly negative consequences for biodiversity and ecosystem goods and services, such as water and food supply. It is known that past large-scale losses of global ecosystems and species extinctions have been associated with rapid climate change combined with other ecological stressors. Loss and/or degradation of ecosystems, and rates of extinction because of human pressures over the last century or more, which have intensified in recent decades, have contributed to a very high rate of extinction by geological standards. It is well established that loss or degradation of ecosystem services occurs as a consequence of species extinctions, declining species abundance, or widespread shifts in species and biome distributions (Leadley et al. 2010). Climate change is projected to exacerbate the situation. This section outlines the likely consequences for some key ecosystems and for biodiversity. The literature tends to confirm the conclusions from the AR4 outlined above. Despite the existence of detailed and highly informative case studies, upon which this section will draw, it is also important to recall that there remain many uncertainties (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, and Courchamp, 2012). However, threshold behavior is known to occur in biological systems (Barnosky et al. 2012) and most model projections agree on major adverse consequences for biodiversity in a 4°C world (Bellard et al., 2012). With high levels of warming, coalescing human induced stresses on ecosystems have the potential to trigger large-scale ecosystem collapse (Barnosky et al. 2012). Furthermore, while uncertainty remains in the projections, there is a risk not only of major loss of valuable ecosystem services, particularly to the poor and the most vulnerable who depend on them, but also of feedbacks being initiated that would result in ever higher CO2 emissions and thus rates of global warming. Significant effects of climate change are already expected for warming well below 4°C. In a scenario of 2.5°C warming, severe ecosystem change, based on absolute and relative changes in carbon and water fluxes and stores, cannot be ruled out on any continent (Heyder, Schaphoff, Gerten, & Lucht, 2011). If warming is limited to less than 2°C, with constant or slightly declining precipitation, small biome shifts are projected, and then only in temperate and tropical regions. Considerable change is projected for cold and tropical climates already at 3°C of warming. At greater than 4°C of warming, biomes in temperate zones will also be substantially affected. These changes would impact not only the human and animal communities that directly rely on the ecosystems, but would also exact a cost (economic and otherwise) on society as a whole, ranging from extensive loss of biodiversity and diminished land cover, through to loss of ecosystems services such as fisheries and forestry (de Groot et al., 2012; Farley et al., 2012). Ecosystems have been found to be particularly sensitive to geographical patterns of climate change (Gonzalez, Neilson, Lenihan, and Drapek, 2010). Moreover, ecosystems are affected not only by local changes in the mean temperature and precipitation, along with changes in the variability of these quantities and changes by the occurrence of extreme events. These climatic variables are thus decisive factors in determining plant structure and ecosystem composition (Reu et al., 2011). Increasing vulnerability to heat and drought stress will likely lead to increased mortality and species extinction. For example, temperature extremes have already been held responsible for mortality in Australian flying-fox species (Welbergen, Klose, Markus, and Eby 2008), and interactions between phenological changes driven by gradual climate changes and extreme events can lead to reduced fecundity (Campbell et al. 2009; Inouye, 2008). Climate change also has the potential to facilitate the spread and establishment of invasive species (pests and weeds) (Hellmann, Byers, Bierwagen, & Dukes, 2008; Rahel & Olden, 2008) with often detrimental implications for ecosystem services and biodiversity. Human land-use changes are expected to further exacerbate climate change driven ecosystem changes, particularly in the tropics, where rising temperatures and reduced precipitation are expected to have major impacts (Campbell et al., 2009; Lee & Jetz, 2008). Ecosystems will be affected by the increased occurrence of extremes such as forest loss resulting from droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion (Fischlin et al., 2007). Climate change also has the potential to catalyze rapid shifts in ecosystems such as sudden forest loss or regional loss of agricultural productivity resulting from desertification (Barnosky et al., 2012). The predicted increase in extreme climate events would also drive dramatic ecosystem changes (Thibault and Brown 2008; Wernberg, Smale, and Thomsen 2012). One such extreme event that is expected to have immediate impacts on ecosystems is the increased rate of wildfire occurrence. Climate change induced shifts in the fire regime are therefore in turn powerful drivers of biome shifts, potentially resulting in considerable changes in carbon fluxes over large areas (Heyder et al., 2011; Lavorel et al., 2006) It is anticipated that global warming will lead to global biome shifts (Barnosky et al. 2012). Based on 20th century observations and 21st century projections, poleward latitudinal biome shifts of up to 400 km are possible in a 4° C world (Gonzalez et al., 2010). In the case of mountaintop ecosystems, for example, such a shift is not necessarily possible, putting them at particular risk of extinction (La Sorte and Jetz, 2010). Species that dwell at the upper edge of continents or on islands would face a similar impediment to adaptation, since migration into adjacent ecosystems is not possible (Campbell, et al. 2009; Hof, Levinsky, Araújo, and Rahbek 2011). The consequences of such geographical shifts, driven by climatic changes as well as rising CO2 concentrations, would be found in both reduced species richness and species turnover (for example, Phillips et al., 2008; White and Beissinger 2008). A study by (Midgley and Thuiller, 2011) found that, of 5,197 African plant species studied, 25–42 percent could lose all suitable range by 2085. It should be emphasized that competition for space with human agriculture over the coming century is likely to prevent vegetation expansion in most cases (Zelazowski et al., 2011) Species composition changes can lead to structural changes of the entire ecosystem, such as the increase in lianas in tropical and temperate forests (Phillips et al., 2008), and the encroachment of woody plants in temperate grasslands (Bloor et al., 2008, Ratajczak et al., 2012), putting grass-eating herbivores at risk of extinction because of a lack of food available—this is just one example of the sensitive intricacies of ecosystem responses to external perturbations. There is also an increased risk of extinction for herbivores in regions of drought-induced tree dieback, owing to their inability to digest the newly resident C4 grasses (Morgan et al., 2008). The following provides some examples of ecosystems that have been identified as particularly vulnerable to climate change. The discussion is restricted to ecosystems themselves, rather than the important and often extensive impacts on ecosystems services. Boreal-temperate ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to climate change, although there are large differences in projections, depending on the future climate model and emission pathway studied. Nevertheless there is a clear risk of large-scale forest dieback in the boreal-temperate system because of heat and drought (Heyder et al., 2011). Heat and drought related die-back has already been observed in substantial areas of North American boreal forests (Allen et al., 2010), characteristic of vulnerability to heat and drought stress leading to increased mortality at the trailing edge of boreal forests. The vulnerability of transition zones between boreal and temperate forests, as well as between boreal forests and polar/tundra biomes, is corroborated by studies of changes in plant functional richness with climate change (Reu et al., 2011), as well as analyses using multiple dynamic global vegetation models (Gonzalez et al., 2010). Subtle changes within forest types also pose a great risk to biodiversity as different plant types gain dominance (Scholze et al., 2006). Humid tropical forests also show increasing risk of major climate induced losses. At 4°C warming above pre-industrial levels, the land extent of humid tropical forest, characterized by tree species diversity and biomass density, is expected to contract to approximately 25 percent of its original size [see Figure 3 in (Zelazowski et al., 2011)], while at 2°C warming, more than 75 percent of the original land can likely be preserved. For these ecosystems, water availability is the dominant determinant of climate suitability (Zelazowski et al., 2011). In general, Asia is substantially less at risk of forest loss than the tropical Americas. However, even at 2°C, the forest in the Indochina peninsula will be at risk of die-back. At 4°C, the area of concern grows to include central Sumatra, Sulawesi, India and the Philippines, where up to 30 percent of the total humid tropical forest niche could be threatened by forest retreat (Zelazowski et al., 2011). There has been substantial scientific debate over the risk of a rapid and abrupt change to a much drier savanna or grassland ecosystem under global warming. This risk has been identified as a possible planetary tipping point at around a warming of 3.5–4.5°C, which, if crossed, would result in a major loss of biodiversity, ecosystem services and the loss of a major terrestrial carbon sink, increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations (Lenton et al., 2008)(Cox, et al., 2004) (Kriegler, Hall, Held, Dawson, and Schellnhuber, 2009). Substantial uncertainty remains around the likelihood, timing and onset of such risk due to a range of factors including uncertainty in precipitation changes, effects of CO2 concentration increase on water use efficiency and the CO2 fertilization effect, land-use feedbacks and interactions with fire frequency and intensity, and effects of higher temperature on tropical tree species and on important ecosystem services such as pollinators. While climate model projections for the Amazon, and in particular precipitation, remain quite uncertain recent analyses using IPCC AR4 generation climate indicates a reduced risk of a major basin wide loss of precipitation compared to some earlier work. If drying occurs then the likelihood of an abrupt shift to a drier, less biodiverse ecosystem would increase. Current projections indicate that fire occurrence in the Amazon could double by 2050, based on the A2 SRES scenario that involves warming of approximately 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (Silvestrini et al., 2011), and can therefore be expected to be even higher in a 4°C world. Interactions of climate change, land use and agricultural expansion increase the incidence of fire (Aragão et al., 2008), which plays a major role in the (re)structuring of vegetation (Gonzalez et al., 2010; Scholze et al., 2006). A decrease in precipitation over the Amazon forests may therefore result in forest retreat or transition into a low biomass forest (Malhi et al., 2009). Moderating this risk is a possible increase in ecosystem water use efficiency with increasing CO2 concentrations is accounted for, more than 90 percent of the original humid tropical forest niche in Amazonia is likely to be preserved in the 2°C case, compared to just under half in the 4°C warming case (see Figure 5 in Zelazowski et al., 2011) (Cook, Zeng, and Yoon, 2012; Salazar & Nobre, 2010). Recent work has analyzed a number of these factors and their uncertainties and finds that the risk of major loss of forest due to climate is more likely to be regional than Amazon basin-wide, with the eastern and southeastern Amazon being most at risk (Zelazowski et al., 2011). Salazar and Nobre (2010) estimates a transition from tropical forests to seasonal forest or savanna in the eastern Amazon could occur at warming at warming of 2.5–3.5°C when CO2 fertilization is not considered and 4.5–5.5°C when it is considered. It is important to note, as Salazar and Nobre (2010) point out, that the effects of deforestation and increased fire risk interact with the climate change and are likely to accelerate a transition from tropical forests to drier ecosystems. Increased CO2 concentration may also lead to increased plant water efficiency (Ainsworth and Long, 2005), lowering the risk of plant die-back, and resulting in vegetation expansion in many regions, such as the Congo basin, West Africa and Madagascar (Zelazowski et al., 2011), in addition to some dry-land ecosystems (Heyder et al., 2011). The impact of CO2 induced ‘greening’ would, however, negatively affect biodiversity in many ecosystems. In particular encroachment of woody plants into grasslands and savannahs in North American grassland and savanna communities could lead to a decline of up to 45 percent in species richness ((Ratajczak and Nippert, 2012) and loss of specialist savanna plant species in southern Africa (Parr, Gray, and Bond, 2012). Mangroves are an important ecosystem and are particularly vulnerable to the multiple impacts of climate change, such as: rise in sea levels, increases in atmospheric CO2 concentration, air and water temperature, and changes in precipitation patterns. Sea-level rise can cause a loss of mangroves by cutting off the flow of fresh water and nutrients and drowning the roots (Dasgupta, Laplante et al. 2010). By the end of the 21st century, global mangrove cover is projected to experience a significant decline because of heat stress and sea-level rise (Alongi, 2008; Beaumont et al., 2011). In fact, it has been estimated that under the A1B emissions scenario (3.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels) mangroves would need to geographically move on average about 1 km/year to remain in suitable climate zones (Loarie et al., 2009). The most vulnerable mangrove forests are those occupying low-relief islands such as small islands in the Pacific where sea-level rise is a dominant factor. Where rivers are lacking and/ or land is subsiding, vulnerability is also high. With mangrove losses resulting from deforestation presently at 1 to 2 percent per annum (Beaumont et al., 2011), climate change may not be the biggest immediate threat to the future of mangroves. However if conservation efforts are successful in the longer term climate change may become a determining issue (Beaumont et al., 2011). Coral reefs are acutely sensitive to changes in water temperatures, ocean pH and intensity and frequency of tropical cyclones. Mass coral bleaching is caused by ocean warming and ocean acidification, which results from absorption of CO2 (for example, Frieler et al., 2012a). Increased sea-surface temperatures and a reduction of available carbonates are also understood to be driving causes of decreased rates of calcification, a critical reef-building process (De’ath, Lough, and Fabricius, 2009). The effects of climate change on coral reefs are already apparent. The Great Barrier Reef, for example, has been estimated to have lost 50 percent of live coral cover since 1985, which is attributed in part to coral bleaching because of increasing water temperatures (De’ath et al., 2012). Under atmospheric CO2 concentrations that correspond to a warming of 4°C by 2100, reef erosion will likely exceed rates of calcification, leaving coral reefs as “crumbling frameworks with few calcareous corals” (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007). In fact, frequency of bleaching events under global warming in even a 2°C world has been projected to exceed the ability of coral reefs to recover. The extinction of coral reefs would be catastrophic for entire coral reef ecosystems and the people who depend on them for food, income and shoreline. Reefs provide coastal protection against coastal floods and rising sea levels, nursery grounds and habitat for a variety of currently fished species, as well as an invaluable tourism asset. These valuable services to often subsistence-dependent coastal and island societies will most likely be lost well before a 4°C world is reached. The preceding discussion reviewed the implications of a 4°C world for just a few examples of important ecosystems. The section below examines the effects of climate on biological diversity Ecosystems are composed ultimately of the species and interactions between them and their physical environment. Biologically rich ecosystems are usually diverse and it is broadly agreed that there exists a strong link between this biological diversity and ecosystem productivity, stability and functioning (McGrady-Steed, Harris, and Morin, 1997; David Tilman, Wedin, and Knops, 1996)(Hector, 1999; D Tilman et al., 2001). Loss of species within ecosystems will hence have profound negative effects on the functioning and stability of ecosystems and on the ability of ecosystems to provide goods and services to human societies. It is the overall diversity of species that ultimately characterizes the biodiversity and evolutionary legacy of life on Earth. As was noted at the outset of this discussion, species extinction rates are now at very high levels compared to the geological record. Loss of those species presently classified as ‘critically endangered’ would lead to mass extinction on a scale that has happened only five times before in the last 540 million years. The loss of those species classified as ‘endangered’ and ‘vulnerable’ would confirm this loss as the sixth mass extinction episode (Barnosky 2011). Loss of biodiversity will challenge those reliant on ecosystems services. Fisheries (Dale, Tharp, Lannom, and Hodges, 2010), and agronomy (Howden et al., 2007) and forestry industries (Stram & Evans, 2009), among others, will need to match species choices to the changing climate conditions, while devising new strategies to tackle invasive pests (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, and Courchamp, 2012). These challenges would have to be met in the face of increasing competition between natural and agricultural ecosystems over water resources. Over the 21st-century climate change is likely to result in some bio-climates disappearing, notably in the mountainous tropics and in the poleward regions of continents, with new, or novel, climates developing in the tropics and subtropics (Williams, Jackson, and Kutzbach, 2007). In this study novel climates are those where 21st century projected climates do not overlap with their 20th century analogues, and disappearing climates are those 20th century climates that do not overlap with 21st century projected climates. The projections of Williams et al (2007) indicate that in a 4°C world (SRES A2), 12–39 percent of the Earth’s land surface may experience a novel climate compared to 20th century analogues. Predictions of species response to novel climates are difficult because researchers have no current analogue to rely upon. However, at least such climates would give rise to disruptions, with many current species associations being broken up or disappearing entirely. Under the same scenario an estimated 10–48 percent of the Earth’s surface including highly biodiverse regions such as the Himalayas, Mesoamerica, eastern and southern Africa, the Philippines and the region around Indonesia known as Wallacaea would lose their climate space. With limitations on how fast species can disperse, or move, this indicates that many species may find themselves without a suitable climate space and thus face a high risk of extinction. Globally, as in other studies, there is a strong association apparent in these projections between regions where the climate disappears and biodiversity hotspots. Limiting warming to lower levels in this study showed substantially reduced effects, with the magnitude of novel and disappearing climates scaling linearly with global mean warming. More recent work by Beaumont and colleagues using a different approach confirms the scale of this risk (Beaumont et al., 2011, Figure 36). Analysis of the exposure of 185 eco-regions of exceptional biodiversity (a subset of the so-called Global 200) to extreme monthly temperature and precipitation conditions in the 21st century compared to 1961–1990 conditions shows that within 60 years almost all of the regions that are already exposed to substantial environmental and social pressure, will experience extreme temperature conditions based on the A2 emission scenario (4.1°C global mean temperature rise by 2100) (Beaumont et al., 2011). Tropical and sub-tropical eco-regions in Africa and South America are particularly vulnerable. Vulnerability to such extremes is particularly acute for high latitude and small island biota, which are very limited in their ability to respond to range shifts, and to those biota, such as flooded grassland, mangroves and desert biomes, that would require large geographical displacements to find comparable climates in a warmer world. The overall sense of recent literature confirms the findings of the AR4 summarized at the beginning of the section, with a number of risks such as those to coral reefs occurring at significantly lower temperatures than estimated in that report. Although non-climate related human pressures are likely to remain a major and defining driver of loss of ecosystems and biodiversity in the coming decades, it is also clear that as warming rises so will the predominance of climate change as a determinant of ecosystem and biodiversity survival. While the factors of human stresses on ecosystems are manifold, in a 4°C world, climate change is likely to become a determining driver of ecosystem shifts and large-scale biodiversity loss (Bellard et al., 2012; New et al., 2011). Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth´s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Such damages to ecosystems would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (e.g., hydrology—quantity flow rates, quality; fisheries (corals), protection of coastline (loss of mangroves). Barnosky has described the present situation facing the biodiversity of the planet as “the perfect storm” with multiple high intensity ecological stresses because of habitat modification and degradation, pollution and other factors, unusually rapid climate change and unusually high and elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations. In the past, as noted above, this combination of circumstances has led to major, mass extinctions with planetary consequences. Thus, there is a growing risk that climate change, combined with other human activities, will cause the irreversible transition of the Earth´s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience (Barnosky et al., 2012).

#### Oceans – 4 degrees trumps resilience

Potsdam Institute, 2012 (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, “Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided”, A report for the World Bank, November, http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn\_Down\_the\_heat\_Why\_a\_4\_degree\_centrigrade\_warmer\_world\_must\_be\_avoided.pdf)

The high emission scenarios would also result in very high carbon dioxide concentrations and ocean acidification, as can be seen in Figure 25 and Figure 26. The increase of carbon dioxide concentration to the present-day value of 390 ppm has caused the pH to drop by 0.1 since preindustrial conditions. This has increased ocean acidity, which because of the logarithmic scale of pH is equivalent to a 30 percent increase in ocean acidity (concentration of hydrogen ions). The scenarios of 4°C warming or more by 2100 correspond to a carbon dioxide concentration of above 800 ppm and lead to a further decrease of pH by another 0.3, equivalent to a 150 percent acidity increase since preindustrial levels. Ongoing ocean acidification is likely to have very severe consequences for coral reefs, various species of marine calcifying organisms, and ocean ecosystems generally (for example, Vézina & Hoegh-Guldberg 2008; Hofmann and Schellnhuber 2009). A recent review shows that the degree and timescale of ocean acidification resulting from anthropogenic CO2 emissions appears to be greater than during any of the ocean acidification events identified so far over the geological past, dating back millions of years and including several mass extinction events (Zeebe 2012). If atmospheric CO2 reaches 450 ppm, coral reef growth around the world is expected to slow down considerably and at 550 ppm reefs are expected to start to dissolve (Cao and Caldeira 2008; Silverman et al. 2009). Reduced growth, coral skeleton weakening, and increased temperature dependence would start to affect coral reefs already below 450 ppm. Thus, a CO2 level of below 350 ppm appears to be required for the long-term survival of coral reefs, if multiple stressors, such as high ocean surface-water temperature events, sea-level rise, and deterioration in water quality, are included (Veron et al. 2009). Based on an estimate of the relationship between atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration and surface ocean acidity (Bernie, Lowe, Tyrrell, and Legge 2010), only very low emission scenarios are able to halt and ultimately reverse ocean acidification (Figure 26). An important caveat on these results is that the approach used here is likely to be valid only for relatively short timescales. If mitigation measures are not implemented soon to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, then ocean acidification can be expected to extend into the deep ocean. The calculations shown refer only to the response of the ocean surface layers, and once ocean acidification has spread more thoroughly, slowing and reversing this will be much more difficult. This would further add significant stress to marine ecosystems already under pressure from human influences, such as overfishing and pollution.

**Extinction**

Kristof 6 (NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF, American journalist, author, op-ed columnist, and a winner of two Pulitzer Prizes, “Scandal Below the Surface”, Oct 31, 2006, http://select.nytimes.com/2006/10/31/opinion/31kristof.html?\_r=1, CMR)

If you think of the earth’s surface as a great beaker, then it’s filled mostly with ocean water. It is slightly alkaline, and that’s what creates a hospitable home for fish, coral reefs and plankton — and indirectly, higher up the food chain, for us. But scientists have discovered that the carbon dioxide **(CO2) we’re spewing** into the air doesn’t just heat up the atmosphere and lead to rising seas. Much of that carbon is absorbed by the oceans, and there it produces carbonic acid — the same stuff found in soda pop. That **makes oceans** a bit **more acidic**, impairing the ability of certain shellfish to produce shells, which, like coral reefs, are made of calcium carbonate. A recent article in Scientific American explained the indignity of being a dissolving mollusk in an acidic ocean: “Drop a piece of chalk (calcium carbonate) into a glass of vinegar (a mild acid) if you need a demonstration of the general worry: the chalk will begin dissolving immediately.” The more acidic waters may spell the end, at least in higher latitudes, of some of the tiniest variations of shellfish — certain plankton and tiny snails called pteropods. **This would** **disrupt the food chain,** possibly killing off many whales and fish, and **rippling up all the way to humans**. We stand, so to speak, on the shoulders of plankton. “There have been a couple of very big events in geological history where the carbon cycle changed dramatically,” said Scott Doney, senior scientist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Massachusetts. One was an abrupt warming that took place 55 million years ago in conjunction with acidification of the oceans and **mass extinctions**. Most scientists don’t believe we’re headed toward a man-made variant on that episode — not **yet**, at any rate. But many worry that **we’re hurtling into unknown dangers.** “Whether in 20 years or 100 years, I think marine **ecosystems are going to be dramatically different** by the end of this century, **and that’ll lead to extinction events**,” Mr. Doney added. “This is the only habitable planet we have,” he said. “The damage we do is going to be felt by all the generations to come.” So that should be one of the great political issues for this century — the vandalism we’re committing to our planet because of our refusal to curb greenhouse gases. Yet the subject is barely debated in this campaign. Changes in ocean chemistry are only one among many damaging consequences of carbon emissions. Evidence is also growing about the more familiar dangers: melting glaciers, changing rainfall patterns, rising seas and more powerful hurricanes. Last year, the World Health Organization released a study indicating that climate change results in an extra 150,000 deaths and five million sicknesses each year, by causing the spread of malaria, diarrhea, malnutrition and other ailments. A report prepared for the British government and published yesterday, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, warned that inaction “could create risks of major disruption to economic and social activity, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and the economic depression of the first half of the 20th century.” If emissions are not curbed, climate change will cut 5 percent to 20 percent of global G.D.P. each year, declared the mammoth report. “In contrast,” it said, “the costs of action — reducing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change — can be limited to around 1 percent of global G.D.P. each year.” Some analysts put the costs of action higher, but most agree that it makes sense to invest far more in alternative energy sources, both to wean ourselves of oil and to reduce the strain on our planet. We know what is needed: a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system, a post-Kyoto accord on emissions cutbacks, and major research on alternative energy sources. But as The Times’s Andrew Revkin noted yesterday, spending on energy research and development has fallen by more than half, after inflation, since 1979.

### Plan – wake

#### The United States federal government should increase statutory restrictions on the War Powers authority of the President by requiring congressional approval before entering armed forces into hostilities to prevent proliferation.

### Contention Two: Solvency

#### Counter-proliferation posture is codified in post-9-11 War Powers authority to preempt – only Congress can check

Gene Healy, 2003. Vice President, CATO Policy Scholars, CATO Institute Handbook for Congress, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2003/9/hb108-11.pdf

In some ways, this is nothing new. Throughout the 20th century, congressional control of the war power eroded, not simply as a result of executive¶ branch aggrandizement, but also because of congressional complicity. The imperial presidency continues to grow, largely because many legislators want to duck their responsibility to decide the question of war and peace;¶ delegate that responsibility to the president; and reserve their right to¶ criticize him, should military action go badly.¶ Indeed, even in authorizing the president to use force, Congress¶ attempted to shirk its responsibility to decide on war. After voting for the¶ resolution, which gave the president all the authority he needs to attack¶ Iraq should he choose to do so, prominent members of Congress insisted¶ they hadn’t really voted to use force. That was for the president to decide.¶ As Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) put it: ‘‘Regardless of¶ how one may have voted on the resolution last night, I think there is an¶ overwhelming consensus . . . that while [war] may be necessary, we’re¶ not there yet.’’¶ It is not for the president to decide whether we are ‘‘there yet.’’ The¶ Constitution leaves that question to Congress. Thus far in the war on¶ terror, though, Congress has dodged that responsibility, delegating it to¶ the president. The use-of-force resolution Congress passed immediately¶ after September 11, 2001, contains an even broader delegation of authority to the president, authorizing him to make war on ‘‘those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided¶ the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001, or harbored such¶ organizations or persons’’ [emphasis added]. By its plain terms, the resolution leaves it to the president to decide when the evidence that a target¶ nation has cooperated with al-Qaeda justifies war. President Bush has¶ exercised that authority in good faith so far, declining to argue that the¶ flimsy evidence of a Saddam–al-Qaeda connection permits him to attack¶ Iraq under the September 14, 2001, resolution. But if Congress wants a say on whether we should go to war with Iran, Syria, Lebanon, or any¶ number of other nations the president may target in the future, it will have a difficult case to make.¶ Such broad delegations of legislative authority are constitutionally suspect in the domestic arena; surely they are no less so when it comes to¶ questions of war and peace. As Madison put it:¶ Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper¶ or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or¶ concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle¶ in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the¶ purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws [emphasis¶ in original].¶ Preemptive Wars¶ The administration’s new security doctrine, which emphasizes preemptive military strikes, may have equally troubling consequences for congressional control over the war power. Under the new doctrine, rogue nations in the process of developing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons will be vulnerable at any time to sudden attack by the United States. In a¶ graduation speech given at West Point on June 1, 2002, President Bush¶ discussed the new strategy: ‘‘The war on terror will not be won on the¶ defensive,’’ he said, ‘‘we must take the battle to the enemy . . . [and]¶ be ready for preemptive action when necessary.’’ The administration¶ formalized the policy in the National Security Strategy of the United¶ States of America, released in September. That document does not discuss¶ whether preemptive wars will be conducted pursuant to congressional¶ authorization or launched unilaterally as surprise attacks by the president.¶ In the case of Iraq, which may be the administration’s first preemptive¶ war, the president has not used the doctrine as an excuse to bypass the¶ constitutional requirement of congressional authorization. But the development of the doctrine must be carefully monitored by this Congress and¶ future ones, lest it become a pretext for unilateral presidential war making.¶ Granted, the Constitution does not categorically rule out unilateral military action by the president. No one would argue that, when missiles are¶ in the air or enemy troops are landing on our shores, the president is¶ obliged to call Congress into session before he can respond. As Madison’s¶ notes from the Constitutional Convention make clear, the constitutional consensus about war powers was that, though Congress had the power to ‘‘commence war,’’ the president would have ‘‘the power to repel sudden attacks.’’ Within that power, there’s some latitude for preemptive strikes.¶ If a rogue state plans a nerve gas attack on the New York subway system,¶ the president need not and should not wait until enemy agents are ashore¶ to order military action.¶ But if the preemptive strike doctrine morphs into a freestanding justification for presidential wars, that will have grave consequences for the¶ constitutional balance of power. The doctrine applies whether or not any¶ specific attack on the United States is planned and whether or not U.S.¶ intelligence can establish with any certainty that the target has weapons¶ of mass destruction (WMD). It could be used by this administration or¶ future ones to avoid the inconvenient task of securing authority from¶ Congress. That would change the president’s constitutional power to repel¶ sudden attacks into a dangerous and unconstitutional power to launch¶ sudden attacks.¶ Moreover, such a power would be ripe for abuse. Firm evidence of¶ WMD capability is very hard to come by—indeed, in the case of Iraq,¶ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld doubts that even an intensive, onthe-ground inspection regime, such as the United Nations operated in Iraq¶ until December 1998, could determine with any degree of certainty what¶ Saddam’s WMD capabilities are. Justifications for preemptive wars will¶ necessarily be speculative and susceptible to manipulation. The potential¶ for politically driven attacks would be enormous.¶ Public opinion polls indicate that Americans view President Bush as a¶ person of integrity and reward him with a high level of public trust. But¶ Bush will not be the last president to wield the broad new powers his¶ administration is forging in the domestic and foreign affairs arenas. As¶ Rumsfeld has noted, the war on terror will take years, and if and when¶ victory is achieved, we may not know with any certainty that we’ve won.¶ Our entire constitutional system repudiates the notion that electing good¶ men is a sufficient check on abuse of power. As President Bush himself¶ noted in his September 17 proclamation: ‘‘In creating our Nation’s Constitutional framework, the Convention’s delegates recognized the dangers¶ inherent in concentrating too much power in one person, branch, or institution.’’ It’s imperative that the 108th Congress resist the tendency to concentrate power and the further growth of the imperial presidency.

#### Obama’s counter-prolif posture is based on the Bush Doctrine interp of war powers authority to preempt

Mathew Waxman, September 11, 2013. “The Most Puzzling Line of the President’s Speech,” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/09/the-most-puzzling-line-of-the-presidents-speech/

My first question is to what he’s referring here, or to which part of the past decade. President Bush undoubtedly held very broad views of war powers, but the two major wars embarked up during his presidency, in Afghanistan and Iraq, were clearly congressionally authorized, and Congress has played a significant role in pushing their wind-down. The 2011 Libya intervention, by contrast, was not congressionally authorized, and the Obama administration adopted the view that the War Powers Resolution did not apply to the operations there (which, unlike the contemplated Syria operations, aimed to help bring down a regime). The Obama administration has also resisted the idea that Congress should re-examine the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which has been interpreted to apply in geographically broad ways that may or may not have been intended by Congress at the time it was adopted. My second question is why, if he believes it’s problematic that more and more war-making power has been put in the hands of the President to the exclusion of Congress, President Obama also adopts the position that he possesses unilateral constitutional authority to act in this case. We haven’t yet seen the underlying legal opinion and analysis, but Jack has pointed out here that in asserting the authority to act independently the Obama administration may be extending, not pulling back on, previous OLC reasoning about presidential power to use force. My third question is about effectiveness. I agree that as a general matter “America acts more effectively abroad when we stand together,” but which is better for the strategic goal Obama lays out here of deterring future chemical weapon use through limited strikes: a more congressionally constrained presidential power or a more flexible one? A President with broad unilateral authority, or a system of strong, formal constitutional checks? I’ve been thinking and writing recently about the relationship between constitutional allocation of war powers and strategies of deterrence or coercive diplomacy, and I believe that even without formally voting to authorize force or not, Congress plays an important role in politically constraining the President and in signaling abroad – to adversaries and allies alike – about our policy preferences and resolve. Part of what worries me about the President’s current approach is that even if the President can win a congressional vote to strike Syria in this instance, the debate so far has shown weak congressional commitment to a global chemical-weapons policing policy – which is what the President claims is important to U.S. security interests (“As the ban against these weapons erodes, other tyrants will have no reason to think twice about acquiring poison gas, and using them”).

#### Statutory restrictions control the perception of force posture – Congressional complicity with Bush doctrine authority implies “green-light” to preempt

Bacevich, 2007 (Andrew, professor of history and international relations at Boston University, “Rescinding the Bush Doctrine”, Boston News, March 1, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial\_opinion/oped/articles/2007/03/01/rescinding\_the\_bush\_doctrine/)

RATHER THAN vainly sniping at President Bush over his management of the Iraq war, the Democratic-controlled Congress ought to focus on averting any recurrence of this misadventure. Decrying the so-called "surge" or curbing the president's authority to conduct ongoing operations will contribute little to that end. Legislative action to foreswear preventive war might contribute quite a lot. Long viewed as immoral, illicit, and imprudent, preventive war -- attacking to keep an adversary from someday posing a danger -- became the centerpiece of US national security strategy in the aftermath of 9/11. President Bush unveiled this new strategy in a speech at West Point in June 2002. "If we wait for threats to fully materialize," he said, "we will have waited too long." The new imperative was to strike before threats could form. Bush declared it the policy of the United States to "impose preemptive, unilateral military force when and where it chooses." Although the Constitution endows the legislative branch with the sole authority to declare war, the president did not consult Congress before announcing his new policy. He promulgated the Bush Doctrine by fiat. Then he acted on it. In 2003, Saddam Hussein posed no immediate threat to the United States; arguing that he might one day do so, the administration depicted the invasion of Iraq as an act of anticipatory self-defense. To their everlasting shame, a majority of members in both the House and the Senate went along, passing a resolution that "authorized" the president to do what he was clearly intent on doing anyway. Implicitly, the Bush Doctrine received congressional endorsement. Events since have affirmed the wisdom of seeing preventive war as immoral, illicit, and imprudent. The Bush administration expected a quick, economical, and decisive victory in Iraq. Advertising the war as an effort to topple a brutal dictator and liberate an oppressed people, it no doubt counted on battlefield success to endow the enterprise with a certain ex post facto legitimacy. Elated Iraqis showering American soldiers with flowers and candies would silence critics who condemned the war as morally unjustified and patently illegal. None of these expectations has come to pass. In its trial run, the Bush Doctrine has been found wanting. Today, Iraq teeters on the brink of disintegration. The war's costs, already staggering, continue to mount. Violence triggered by the US invasion has killed thousands of Iraqi civilians. We cannot fully absolve ourselves of responsibility for those deaths. Our folly has alienated friends and emboldened enemies. Rather than nipping in the bud an ostensibly emerging threat, the Iraq war has diverted attention from existing dangers (such as Al Qaeda) while encouraging potential adversaries (like Iran) to see us as weak. The remedy to this catastrophic failure lies not in having another go -- a preventive attack against Iran, for example -- but in acknowledging that the Bush Doctrine is inherently pernicious. Our reckless flirtation with preventive war qualifies as not only wrong, but also stupid. Indeed, the Bush Doctrine poses a greater danger to the United States than do the perils it supposedly guards against. We urgently need to abrogate that doctrine in favor of principles that reflect our true interests and our professed moral values. Here lies an opportunity for Congress to make a difference. The fifth anniversary of President Bush's West Point speech approaches. Prior to that date, Democratic leaders should offer a binding resolution that makes the following three points: First, the United States categorically renounces preventive war. Second, the United States will henceforth consider armed force to be an instrument of last resort. Third, except in response to a direct attack on the United States, any future use of force will require prior Congressional authorization, as required by the Constitution. The legislation should state plainly our determination to defend ourselves and our allies. But it should indicate no less plainly that the United States no longer claims the prerogative of using "preemptive, unilateral military force when and where it chooses." Declaring the Bush Doctrine defunct will not solve the problems posed by Iraq, but it will reduce the likelihood that we will see more Iraqs in our future. By taking such action, Congress will restore its relevance, its badly tarnished honor, and its standing in the eyes of the American people.

#### Broad development of nuclear energy is slow now – preempting prolif cements the “nuclear suppliers cartel,” killing technology trade and civilian growth

Mueller, 2008 (John, Dept of Political Science at Ohio State University, “The Costs and Consequences of Efforts to Prevent Proliferation”, July 16, http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//apsa08.pdf)

The nonproliferation focus has also exacerbated the nuclear waste problem in the United States. In the late 1970s, the Carter administration banned the reprocessing of nuclear fuel, something that radically reduces the amount of nuclear waste, under the highly questionable assumption that this policy would reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation. Nonproliferation efforts worldwide also hamper worldwide economic development by increasing the effective costs of developing nuclear energy--sometimes even making them prohibitive for some countries. As countries grow, they require ever increasing amounts of power. Any measure that limits their ability to acquire this vital commodity--or increases its price--effectively slows economic growth and essentially kills people by reducing the gains in life expectancy commonly afforded by economic development. The Non-Proliferation Treaty specifically guarantees to signing nonnuclear countries "the fullest possible exchange of technology" for the development of peaceful nuclear power. However, as Richard Betts points out, this rationale has been undermined by the development of a "nuclear suppliers cartel" which has worked to "cut off trade in technology for reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium," thereby reducing the NPT to "a simple demand to the nuclear weapons have-nots to remain so."49 More broadly the nonproliferation quest has from time to time boosted international oil prices to the detriment of almost all the countries in the world except for the potential proliferator. Because nuclear power does not emit greenhouse gases, it is an obvious potential candidate for helping with the problem of global warming, an issue many people hold to be of the highest concern for the future of the planet.

#### Aff signal encourages suppliers – dual-use tech raises security flags – US posture is the number one factor in willingness to assist developing nuclear powers

Kate Davidson, UNE Business School Faculty of the Professions, University of New England, 2012. “Contemporary Perspectives on Nuclear Proliferation,” http://www.une.edu.au/\_\_data/assets/pdf\_file/0008/24110/econwp12-2.pdf

The role of the United States in matters of proliferation cannot be emphasised enough. In the Cold War period, the foreign policies of both the US and the Soviet Union were by and large premised upon nuclear matters and necessarily shaped the nuclear field we are faced with today. Post Cold War, US policy has dominated international interactions. The US does contribute enormously to the development of norms; however its own influence extends beyond and almost independently of these norms. In typical “do as I say, not as I do” style, the US exerts huge pressures on states to follow the path of non-proliferation despite their own attachment to nuclear weapons. Levite (2002/03, p76) acknowledges the “glaring omission” in the literature of a “systematic assessment of the vast array of non-proliferation instruments and assets employed by the United States across the cases of nuclear restraint and reversal”, mounting a convincing argument36 based on the claim that “an understanding with the United States is, in fact, a hallmark of many cases of nuclear slowdown or reversal” (p82). She contends that the US is least influential in effecting the nature of domestic regimes which shape nuclear ambitions, concluding that “success is within reach only to the extent that foreign influence and domestic conditions converge, and the foreign effort is closely tuned (in terms of both agenda and timing) to the domestic context” (p87). While the mechanisms by which the US asserts its influence are many and varied37, the hegemon’s role in non-proliferation is deemed to be fundamental.¶ Following on from this, since the US has been so willing to “purchase” non- proliferation through various means perhaps this leads states to making small developments towards the nuclear end which they can then “sell” in order to enhance their economic or diplomatic standing. Japan and North Korea have been implicated in such actions, and it is certainly a notion worth some consideration. It is also possible that Israel’s unwillingness to admit its own nuclear status is in part that doing so may compromise its foreign aid flows, particularly from the US.¶ The second and related issue of vital significance is the role of sanctions, both positive and negative, in non-proliferation measures. While such actions are inextricably linked with US policy and superpower, the theoretical grounding is markedly different. Quite fortunately for the purpose of this discussion, the very recent publishing of the book ‘Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation’ edited by Solingen (2012) addresses this very subject. While the authors focus largely on specific causal mechanisms, domestic distributional costs and benefits remain at the forefront and provide insight as to how sanctions and inducements, either targeted or comprehensive, can actually have unintended consequences, particularly given varying domestic political economy models and regime types.¶ As noted by Stein (2012, p30) although “sanctions are as old as antiquity”, they are more prevalent now than ever, but “ironically, sanctions can weaken a state absolutely¶ but also strengthen it relatively (to its society and domestic opposition)” (p55). That is, sanctions may actually support the regime which is driving a nuclear program and thereby strengthen its support – a counterproductive action by any standards. Similarly, Kreps and Pasha argue that military threats may make “good politics” domestically (p175), but empirically support the hypothesis that “military threats reinforce the coalitions that are hostile to international economic integration and cooperation with international regimes more generally” (p208) – the very regimes which Solingen argues are most likely to nuclearise.¶ Tying in with the initial point of discussion in this section, Nincic (2012) rethinks the US counter proliferation policy with regard to inducements, intuitively noting that “few measures could be fully effective when not initiated, or at least supported, by the world’s sole superpower” (p127). Observing the “abysmal failure and frequently counterproductive character of threats and punishment” (p153), Nincic pushes the role of positive engagement in non-proliferation measures. In a less US-centric rationale, Drezner (2012) claims “that more comprehensive economic sanctions – or more wide ranging inducements – will often be more likely to lead to the desired policy changes” than ‘smart sanctions’ which are specifically targeted to reduce externalities (p155).¶ The consistent failure of sanctions to procure desired outcomes is a theme throughout the various chapters. Solingen concludes by outlining three factors which burden the probability that sanctions would have the desired effects in the nuclear realm (2012, p347):¶ 1. Inward looking autocracies, being the most frequent targets of these sanctions, are also the least vulnerable to them.¶ 2. Selection bias results as “sanctions are expected to surface only when targets believe that concessions would risk regime survival more than defiance”. That is, targets receptive to inducements may pre-empt sanctions, leaving analysis of sanctions largely on inward-looking autocracies which “appear to be endogenous to why sanctions emerge as tools of statecraft to begin with”.¶ 3. Inward looking autocracies may price nuclear weapons markedly highly, justified as public goods, making them more resistant to comply with non-proliferation demands.¶ To illustrate the common use of these tools, Figure 6 shows the number of sanctions and inducements directed toward the four main targets of the period 1990 to 2009: North Korea, Libya, Iraq and Iran. From this the relative use of sanctions versus inducements for each target can be recognised, as can the dominance of the US in the utilisation of these tools. Other senders depicted in the legend of the Figure are non- US unilateral (Uni), United Nations (UN), and non-UN multilateral (Multi). It is also interesting to note that 78% of sanctions in the past three decades were imposed on non-democratic target states38, which gives rise to a possibility that perhaps discriminate treatment of non-democratic regimes by more powerful nations may provide incentive for nuclear weapon acquisition by the weaker state in a struggle for power. Or in other words, economic mistreatment gives rise to a perception of threatened security, which under the assumption of realism will provide motivation for nuclear weapon acquisition.¶ With Iran’s nuclear ambitions being so enthusiastically repressed at present, a few brief points are worth mentioning – the most obvious being that the huge numbers of sanctions have not worked. Stein notes the need to create an “international sanctioning cartel”39 can often “multilateralize an initial bilateral conflict” (p41). Unilateral sanctions are often ineffective or difficult to implement on their own and thus allies in sanctioning will often be sought. Drezner (2012, p167) points out that Iran “has been under some form of embargo for its entire existence, and the regime has grown comfortable with them”. Nader (2012) examines Iran in greater depth, finding it to be unclear whether sanctions have impacted Iran’s willingness to pursue its nuclear program but also suggesting the nation may actually thrive on a sense of political and economic isolation stemming from its ideology (p214). He concludes: “The regime’s survival is increasingly contingent on a favourable outcome regarding the nuclear program, whether it leads to a virtual or actual nuclear weapons capability. A sanctions regime contributing to Iran’s economic decline cannot alter this reality.” (p231)¶ A third point with regard to external incentives is, again, tied in tightly with the other two but worthy of mention: institutional organisations. A number of institutional non- proliferation measures have been already discussed: these include the IAEA, the UN, regional NWFZs and various other multilateral treaties. Through encouraging membership to these institutions and also utilising mechanisms under these structures, external pressure can be applied to nations in order to discourage them from developing nuclear weapons programs. The role of the US, and the use of sanctions and inducements by various nations, are both major features of any such institution, however, given the complex web of globalised trade and business patterns which have developed across the globe, the interactions of such institutions needs to be considered. ¶ While the subject of external incentives has focussed rather heavily on¶ discouraging proliferation, such circumstances may exist under which external pressures act in favour of nuclearisation. Aggressive marketing by nuclear technology companies may lead a nation down the path of nuclear energy, only to find its “Siamese twin” comes too**.** This now leads into the supply side explanation of ¶ proliferation. ¶ Access to nuclear technology: more able leads to more willing ¶ This theory of nuclear proliferation is a relatively new development in the literature40 ¶ and represents the supply side, positing that a state’s ability to build nuclear weapons ¶ will influence its probability of actually doing so. As nuclear technology has spread ¶ over the globe41¶ ¶ , the technical means of developing nuclear weapons has also spread ¶ through the dual purpose nature of the technology. The technical links between ¶ civilian nuclear facilities and military programs have previously been discussed, as has ¶ the notion of a virtual nuclear state, and it is important to remember that “whether or ¶ not a state wants a nuclear weapons is irrelevant if it is unable to acquire them” ¶ (Kroenig, 2009 p163). However, as many as fifty states could be considered to be ¶ nuclear weapons capable (Hymans, 2010 p13). The puzzle then is to explain the gap ¶ between the number of states which are technically capable of developing nuclear ¶ weapons and the number which actually choose to do so. Supply side theories seem to ¶ have relied heavily on empirical analysis, and as a result some of the quantitative ¶ proliferation literature will now be introduced to this discussion. ¶ Initially, there is a requirement that nuclear capability be defined. The possession of a ¶ nuclear reactor is obviously the first point required for a state to even be considered ¶ nuclear capable, however this is by no means sufficient. Contemporary literature has ¶ built on Meyer’s (1984) landmark book ‘The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation’ and ¶ Stoll’s (1996) revision of this data (cited in Sagan, 2011 p228). In defining nuclear ¶ latency, Meyer measured ten technical and economic indicators – previous national ¶ mining activity, indigenous uranium deposits, metallurgists, steel production, ¶ construction work force, chemical engineers, nitric acid production, electrical ¶ production capacity, nuclear engineers, physicists, chemists and explosives and ¶ electronics specialists42¶ ¶ . As neither the quantity or quality of a state’s nuclear ¶ engineers nor its explosives and electronics specialists could be accurately determined ¶ as being sufficient to develop a nuclear weapon, Meyer used two proxy indicators: ¶ whether the state had been operating a research reactor for three reactor years and ¶ whether the state manufactured automobiles, or assembled automobiles and ¶ manufactured radios and television sets. Based on these indicators, Meyer concluded ¶ that 34 states had the latent capability of building nuclear weapons in 1982 (cited in ¶ Sagan, 2011 p229). ¶ Stoll’s (1996) revision of the data set assumed that all states had access to nuclear ¶ materials since they were (purportedly) available on the open market, and thus ¶ “assumed away the crucial technical bottleneck of whether a state has access to ¶ uranium that, once enriched, could be used in a nuclear weapons program” (Sagan, ¶ 2011 p229). Stoll’s updated data set led to the conclusion that 48 states had latent ¶ weapons capability in 1992. ¶ ¶ Real world events brought supply side issues to the forefront of the proliferation ¶ debate and the 9/11 attack on the United States highlighted the potential role of non-¶ state actors in international conflict. Furthermore, the uncovering of the AQ Khan ¶ network of supplying nuclear equipment and knowledge, and the apparent ¶ nuclearisation of North Korea (more on these later) demonstrated that supply chains ¶ of nuclear material and technology were out of control, and the notion of second tier ¶ proliferation became a subject for debate. Braun and Chyba (2004) point to three ¶ challenges to the non-proliferation regime: ¶ ¶ i. Latent proliferation under the Non-proliferation Treaty ¶ ¶ ii. First tier nuclear proliferation, in which technology or material is ¶ stolen from private companies or state nuclear programs assists ¶ non-nuclear weapon states develop illegal programs ¶ ¶ iii. Second tier proliferation in which states in the developing world with ¶ varying technical capabilities trade amongst themselves to bolster ¶ one another’s nuclear and strategic weapons efforts ¶ ¶ They explore the proliferation “ring” formed by strategic alliances and trade occurring ¶ between and among a list of nations, most notably Pakistan, North Korea, Libya, Iran ¶ and Iraq. This inspired a greater focus on the supply of nuclear technology globally ¶ and more pertinently, the need to better understand the relationship between access ¶ to nuclear technology and materials, and weapons proliferation itself. ¶ ¶ Data coding applied to proliferation studies were further developed by Jo and Gartzke ¶ (2007), who considered the determinants of nuclear proliferation in terms of ¶ opportunity and willingness (p168). On the supply-side, they further organised ¶ opportunity into three categories (p169): the set of technologies related to the ¶ manufacture of nuclear weapons, nuclear fissile materials, and economic capacity. ¶ They then devised three variables upon which to base their analysis (Jo and Gartzke, ¶ 2007 p172-3). First, latent nuclear weapons production capability was constructed by ¶ summing resource and production capacities using seven components: uranium ¶ deposits, metallurgists, chemical engineers, and nuclear ¶ engineers/physicists/chemists, electronic/explosive specialists, nitric acid production ¶ capacity, and electricity production capacity. Second, economic capacity was ¶ constructed using data relating to states’ energy consumption and iron/steel ¶ production. Third, diffusion of knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons was ¶ assumed to occur, and quantified using a log transformation of years passed since ¶ 1938. The dependent variables were dichotomous and coded annually: NWEAPON ¶ identified whether states had a nuclear weapon in the given year, and NPROGRAM a ¶ nuclear weapons program. ¶ ¶ In relation to nuclear proliferation opportunity, they found that latent nuclear ¶ production capabilities increased the predicted probability of having a weapons ¶ program, but did not impact the conditional decision to produce weapons. ¶ Furthermore they concluded that barriers to proliferation ease with the diffusion of ¶ time. This data set was a significant step in the quantitative approach to proliferation ¶ studies and is very widely cited, thus warrants discussion here despite doing little to ¶ actually define nuclear latency. Their measure of nuclear latency was a simple scale ¶ from zero to seven reflecting the seven components of the index. Sagan (2011, p229) ¶ is quite critical of Jo and Gartzke’s coding, claiming the failure to treat possession of ¶ fissile materials as necessary for nuclear capability as inadequate. The shortcomings¶ of their coding rules are evidenced by the fact that North Korea and South Africa are ¶ both considered to not have full capability to develop weapons in 200143¶ ¶ (ibid). ¶ More recently, the supply side proliferation literature has explored the relationship between civilian nuclear assistance and nuclear proliferation. Matthew Fuhrmann has contributed enormously to the proliferation literature to this end44. He explored the determinants of dual-use trade (2008), defining dual-use commodities as having two ¶ applications: “they can be used in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs but ¶ also have many legitimate civilian applications” (p634). With most governments placing restrictions on the export of such commodities he was able to analyse licensed dual-use exports from the US between 1991 and 2001 (post Cold War era). He concludes his research to be “preliminary support for the assertion that states channel dual-use trade towards destinations where security guarantees exist and away from targets where security threats are present to minimise its potentially negative security externalities” 45¶ ¶ (p648). Following from this, Fuhrmann (2009a) explores whether the diffusion of knowledge makes proliferation more likely and further examines the determinants of civilian nuclear cooperation (2009b). These works tie in with the ¶ research of Matthew Kroenig, another significant contributor on the topic of nuclear ¶ assistance.

#### It’s reverse-causal – supplier perception is key to nuclear expansion – secure financing trumps obstacles

Sharon Squassoni, director and se- nior fellow of the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, she was a senior asso- ciate in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2010. “Mapping Nuclear Power’s Future Spread, ” NUCLEAR POWER’S GLOBAL EXPANSION: WEIGHING ITS COSTS AND RISKS Henry Sokolski Editor, online

The largest increases in nuclear capacity in the next 20-30 years undoubtedly will occur in Asia, specifically, China, Japan, South Korea, and India. These countries are building nuclear power plants now and anticipate continued high economic growth levels. Other countries could feel the pinch of the current financial crisis more acutely, dampening demand for electricity below anticipated levels. A major expansion of nuclear power across the board, however, is not a foregone conclusion.¶ In addition, the traditional challenges besetting nuclear energy—cost, safety, waste, and proliferation—will likely continue to limit widespread growth. Government policies supporting nuclear energy in the future—as has been the case in the past—would be necessary to make major expansion a reality.¶ For many states, cost is the first and most immediate obstacle to nuclear expansion. But in those states where there is heavy involvement by the government in electricity markets, supporting nuclear energy may be as simple as providing government funding or financing. Solutions to nuclear waste tend to be deferred into the future, but policies by major suppliers to take back spent fuel could provide some incentives for growth. In states seeking nuclear power for the first time, actions to develop what some have termed the “three Ss”—safeguards, safety, and security— could improve their attractiveness to nuclear vendors. In all countries, some limits on, or costs attached to, carbon dioxide emissions could help enhance the attractiveness of nuclear power, but these should also enhance the attractiveness of renewable sources of energy as well.

#### Status quo scares demand, too – wannabe nuclear power states perceive preemption as the norm

Henry Sokolski Executive Director¶ The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Editor, December 2010. NUCLEAR POWER’S GLOBAL EXPANSION: WEIGHING ITS COSTS AND RISKS, online

With commercial nuclear energy projects, especially those exported overseas, there is a major additional worry—nuclear energy’s link to nuclear weapons proliferation. Here, the security risks are real, particularly in the Middle East. Israel, the United States, Iran, and Iraq have launched aerial bombing or missile strikes against reactors at Osirak in Iraq and Bushehr in Iran, even though Iraq and Iran were members of the Nu- clear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the attacked reactors were under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. If one includes the 2007 Israeli strike against Syria’s reactor and Iraq’s failed missile attack against Dimona during the first Gulf War, there have been no fewer than 13 acts of war directed against IAEA member state reactors. Such facts should put a security premium on efforts to subsidize the construction of such projects both here and abroad. Certainly, the more the U.S. and other advanced economies go out of their way to use gov- ernment financial incentives to promote the expansion of nuclear power programs domestically or overseas, the more difficult it is likely to be to dissuade devel- oping nations from making similar investments. This dynamic will exist even if the nuclear projects in ques- tion are clearly uncompetitive with nonnuclear alter- natives. Moreover, we should be trying to discourage subsidies that substantially assist these states to move closer to developing nuclear weapons options.

#### States pursue nuclear capacity in a dead zone of i-law – plan would be a clear legal check on force

Cristian DeFrancia was a legal adviser at the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal in The Hague from 2005 to 2012. 2012. “Enforcing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: The Legality of Preventive Measures,” online, vanderbilt journal of transnational law [vol. 45:705]

International law is highly restrictive on the use of force by states without Security Council authorization. The scope of self- defense to justify unilateral action on a preemptive basis has been thoroughly vetted through debates relating to the Iraq War, which have done little to produce consensus.401 In the meantime, jurists continue to facilitate an ever-widening gap by promoting impracticably broad offensive restrictions and narrow defensive permissions for the use of force. In the defensive context, as Theresa Reinold notes, a divergence has already resulted between state practice and international law doctrine.402 Where preventive force is concerned, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense has gained little traction as a basis for justifying unilateral force.403 The concept of an “imminent” attack remains confined in nineteenth century conceptions, as articulated in the Caroline case.404 Notwithstanding Ian Brownlie’s early 1963 recognition that, due to the advent of long- range missiles in a state of readiness, “the difference between attack and imminent attack may now be negligible,”405 carving out a doctrine of anticipatory self-defense that does not eviscerate the prohibition on the use of force has historically been an unworkable proposition. Thus, unilateral preventive force does not occupy a sound position under the current scheme of international law. In the context of low-level conflict, numerous quandaries on the law of force surface. It is unclear, for example, whether targeted killings of Iranian nuclear scientists should be a matter of Iranian domestic law or a question of international humanitarian law. In the absence of an attribution of responsibility for such acts, it is difficult to prove a nexus to international conflict, inviting the question— similarly posed in the context of terrorism—of whether such isolated acts should be considered primarily a criminal law matter. Moreover, under prevailing standards on the use of force, isolated killings would likely not be considered an armed attack meriting the invocation of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.406 Forcible reprisals for such targeted killings would therefore be problematic under international law. The absence of clear-cut legal standards in the context of low-level conflict suggests that international law is ill- equipped to deal with such situations. Assuming that a state suspected of developing nuclear weapons is the victim of an unlawful use of force targeting the cessation of that activity, the suspect state may face the grim reality of having no effective remedy. Although international law does not excuse the unlawful use of force in the context of a counterproliferation strategy, a state that has been isolated as a result of its alleged interests in developing a nuclear weapon may be in the awkward situation of having little support in the collective security apparatus for addressing low-level uses of force. One prominent example is the attack on the Dair Alzour/Ali Kibar nuclear site in Syria in 2007 and the ensuing silence of the international community. At the time of the attack, both the attacker and the nature of the facility attacked remained unclear, though it later became clear that Israel launched the attack.407 The international response to the attack at Dair Alzour was relatively muted,408 with no Security Council condemnation (in contrast with Israel’s 1982 attack on the Iraqi Osirak reactor, which was condemned by the Security Council in Resolution 487).409 On May 24, 2011, the IAEA concluded on the basis of environmental samples, satellite imagery, photographs, and other assessments that the facility was likely a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency.410 The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the Security Council on June 9, 2011.411 Although it’s widely understood that the airstrikes on Dair Alzour were an unlawful use of force, it is also undisputed that the muted reaction signals an increasing lack of global political concern regarding the legality of such low-level uses of force when the target state is outside of international norms regarding nuclear policy.412 The closest corollary in legal doctrine that captures the international community’s muted response to the Dair Alzour strikes is found in the doctrine of “clean hands,”413 or the principle that “an unlawful act cannot serve as the basis of an action in law.”

#### The prolif dilemma underlies all nuclear energy development – relaxing posture is key to safe distribution at a scale large enough to solve warming

Squassoni, 2009 (Sharon, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace focusing on nuclear nonproliferation and national security, “Nuclear Power: How Much More?” Nuclear Policy Education Center, March 25, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=176&rid=2)

The amount of nuclear capacity required to make a signification contribution to global climate change mitigation is so large that it would inevitably be widely distributed across the globe. Such a distribution would have particular implications for nuclear proliferation. However, projected distributions of nuclear energy out to 2050 are extremely speculative. The industry itself does not engage in such projections, and countries that set nuclear energy production goals have a history of widely missing long-range targets, such as China and India. The discussion below considers a hypothetical distribution of nuclear energy for 2050, based on the 2003 MIT Study. [12] Scenario III, shown in Figure 7, uses the “High 2050” scenario in Appendix 2 (“Global Electricity Demand and the Nuclear Power Growth Scenario”) of the 2003 MIT study, The Future of Nuclear Power. Although this is not a distribution designed to achieve optimal CO2 reductions, it is expansion at a level significant enough (1500 GWe) to have an effect on CO2 emissions. This would mean a fourfold increase from current reactor capacity. The MIT study used an underlying assumption that the developed countries would continue with a modest annual increase in per capita electricity use and the developing countries would move to the 4000 kWh per person per year benchmark if at all feasible (the 4000 kWh benchmark being the dividing line between developed and advanced countries). Electricity demand was then pegged to estimated population growth. Finally, it was assumed that nuclear energy would retain or increase its current share of electricity generation. The least-off developing countries were assumed in the MIT study not to have the wherewithal for nuclear energy. It should be noted that MIT’s 2050 projection was “an attempt to understand what the distribution of nuclear power deployment would be if robust growth were realized, perhaps driven by a broad commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and a concurrent resolution of the various challenges confronting nuclear power’s acceptance in various countries.” A few countries that the MIT High 2050 case included but are not included here are countries that currently have laws restricting nuclear energy, such as Austria. Implications for Uranium Enrichment A fourfold expansion of nuclear energy would entail significant new production requirements for uranium enrichment as shown in Figure 8 and possibly, reprocessing. The MIT study anticipated that 54 states would have reactor capacities that could possibly justify indigenous uranium enrichment. If a capability of 10 GWe is considered the threshold at which indigenous enrichment becomes cost-effective, more than 15 additional states could find it advantageous to engage in uranium enrichment. Figure 9 depicts what the geographic distribution of enrichment capacity might look like, based on the development of 10 GWe or more of reactor capacity. Of course, some states – such as Australia or Kazakhstan – might opt to enrich uranium regardless of domestic nuclear energy capacity, choosing to add value to their own uranium exports. In addition, states may choose to take the path of the UAE, which has formally renounced domestic enrichment and reprocessing in its domestic law, despite aspiring to reach 10 GWe of capacity. Ultimately, these decisions lie very much in the political realm, and can be reversed. Implications for Proliferation Proliferation experts generally fall into two camps – those that do not consider power reactors a cause for proliferation concern but focus on the sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and those that are concerned about the entire fuel cycle. Advocates of nuclear energy point out that most states that have developed nuclear weapons have used dedicated production or research reactors rather than power reactors to produce their fissile material [13]; others point to the potential for a state to use peaceful nuclear power to further a clandestine weapons program, either through technology transfer, hiding clandestine activities within a peaceful nuclear fuel cycle or diverting lightly irradiated fuel to be further enriched. Regardless of one’s views on the proliferation risks of power reactors, the recent surge of enthusiasm for nuclear energy poses several proliferation risks. First, recent enthusiasm is not limited just to power reactors. On the enrichment side, President Bush’s 2004 initiative to limit capabilities to current technology holders failed, not just in strategy but also in tactics. For example, Argentina, Canada, and South Africa have all expressed an interest in keeping their enrichment options open. Brazil, which is commissioning a new centrifuge enrichment plant at Resende, will likely produce more low-enriched uranium than is needed for its own consumption by 2015. By and large, these countries do not produce nuclear energy on at scale large enough to make domestic enrichment capability economic. [14] However, they have keen national interests in maintaining their right to enrich. Faced with allied objections to restricting future options, the Bush Administration folded. This is partly the reason for the impasse at the NSG on further detailed criteria restricting enrichment and reprocessing. A perception of the U.S. approach as discriminatory could open the door to further challenges. Even if piecemeal efforts to limit the number of states with uranium-enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing capabilities succeed, these could ultimately further erode the NPT by extending the existence of haves and have-nots from nuclear weapons into the nuclear fuel cycle. In the short term, efforts to limit expansion could slow some states’ implementation of the safeguards-strengthening measures in the 1997 Model Additional Protocol. In the long term, other decisions to strengthen the NPT could be jeopardized. On the reprocessing end, the United States has recently embraced spent fuel reprocessing at home and abroad. From the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to nuclear cooperation with India, Bush administration policies supported reprocessing. This is a complete reversal from the policies adopted in the mid-1970s not to encourage the use of plutonium in the civilian fuel cycle. A nuclear renaissance that embraces reprocessing as necessary to reduce spent fuel accumulation could result in more plutonium in transit, providing more potential targets for diversion. A renaissance that includes widespread installation of fast reactors would similarly increase targets for diversion. Although GNEP advocates stress that the kind of spent fuel “conditioning” they favor would not result in the separation of plutonium, there are few assurances thus far that new techniques are any more proliferation-resistant than PUREX. As opponents like to point out, no future fuel conditioning technique in the United States will be more proliferation resistant than storing spent fuel. And while most countries are probably interested in having someone else solve the problem either of spent fuel storage or high-level waste storage, no commercial reprocessing service currently will store high-level waste. Neither the United States, nor Russia, nor France has committed to taking back spent fuel under GNEP. A further question is whether the next generation of reactors will be more or less proliferation-resistant than existing reactors. As of December 2002, the Generation IV Forum had not yet adopted a standard methodology for evaluating proliferation resistance and physical protection for the six systems under consideration. In addition, there have been a few reports that India is considering exporting its Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors. India may not be the only state in a second tier of suppliers that might be interested in exporting reactors, injecting some uncertainty into assessments. Beyond the technical realm, there are very real political questions about widespread diffusion of civilian nuclear power. Would new nuclear states would raise proliferation concerns by virtue of their geographic location, the existence of terrorist groups on their soil, or other sources of political instability? Would expanded nuclear infrastructure in Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Vietnam, and the GCC countries lead their neighbors to worry about and respond to the possibility that these countries will develop weapons programs? The expansion of nuclear power would also have practical consequences for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Additional facilities will place additional safeguards requirements on IAEA inspectors It is unclear how the IAEA will meet these requirements – will these mean more inspection days or will other approaches be used under the “integrated safeguards” program? Although reactors themselves require relatively few inspection days, there will be significant work in helping prepare new nuclear states for nuclear power programs. Already, the IAEA has conducted workshops on infrastructure requirements, including energy needs and planning considerations; nuclear security and safeguards; physical infrastructure; current and future reactor technology; experience in developing nuclear programs; human resource requirements; and public perceptions. States must also develop their states systems of accounting and control. A nuclear expansion, in particular, that results in more states with bulk-handling facilities (enrichment and reprocessing) could place significant strain on the IAEA and the inspections system. Recent experience suggest that current methods of inspection cannot provide timely detection. The fact that the IAEA’s goals for timely detection are clearly longer than material conversion times – that is, the time it would take for a proliferator to produce finished metal shapes – is a big concern. The largest enrichment and reprocessing plants under safeguards now are under EURATOM safeguards; the IAEA’s role in verifying material balances in those plants is limited by the IAEA-EURATOM agreement. The only experience in safeguarding commercial-scale enrichment and reprocessing plants outside of EURATOM in a non-nuclear-weapon state is in Japan, where incidents with significant material losses have raised questions. British commercial reprocessing at the THORP facility also has produced recurring reports of significant materials losses. Perhaps the largest question about a nuclear expansion is whether or not planned technological developments will outpace nonproliferation initiatives, such as fuel supply assurances and multinational fuel-cycle centers, voluntary export guidelines, and further restrictions within the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Criticism of the U.S. GNEP program had been aimed in part at the aggressive timeline for technology demonstration of advanced reprocessing, in contrast to developments more closely tied to nonproliferation objectives, such as supporting more proliferation-resistant reactors with sealed fuel cores that would limit handling of fuel. Already, efforts to manage expansion of the front and back ends of the fuel cycle, whether nuclear fuel assurances, fuel banks, or fuel leasing projects, have abandoned any concepts of formal restraints in favor of incentives. It is too soon to tell how compelling those incentives will be. Finally, although there is disagreement among experts about the proliferation potential of light water reactors, it is clear that the proliferation potential of a country with no nuclear expertise is lower than that of a country with nuclear power and its associated infrastructure. The current encouraging climate for nuclear energy – new cooperation agreements between France and the UAE, Libya and Algeria, and between the United States and Turkey and Jordan, for a few – suggests that regardless of global climate change concerns, or whether or not a significant expansion occurs, some states in the Middle East will develop nuclear energy. It is not clear whether new nuclear reactors in the Middle East would result in new enrichment or reprocessing plants in the Middle East. In part, much depends on the outcome of negotiations with Iran on its enrichment capabilities. If states clearly renounce making nuclear fuel and allow sufficient wide- ranging inspections to verify such pledges, the proliferation implications could be significantly diminished. The hope is that this can be accomplished with the UAE.

#### Nuclear power is necessary to avoid four degrees warming

Comeau 3-12-20’13

[Steve, a database programmer and a member of Local Motion, a Burlington-based group that promotes people-powered transportation, “Comeau: Nuclear power can be tool in avoiding global warming”, http://vtdigger.org/2013/03/12/comeau-nuclear-power-can-be-tool-in-avoiding-global-warming/]

Nuclear power is used to generate electricity, primarily replacing the use of coal for that purpose. In the two years since the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear facility disaster hundreds of thousands of people worldwide have died from air pollution related to burning coal. According to the World Health Organization, “Urban outdoor air pollution is estimated to cause 1.3 million deaths worldwide per year.” Much of that pollution can be attributed to coal, which accounts for over 40 percent of electricity generated in the world. Burning coal produces massive amounts of waste products including fly ash, sulfur dioxide, mercury, and other heavy metals. Burning coal is bad for the environment and human health. But the biggest issue with burning coal is that it is the largest contributor of CO2 emissions, and therefore a huge contributor to human-caused global warming. To make progress on reducing CO2 emissions related to global warming, coal needs to stay in the ground. Of course there are many political and economic forces that make this close to impossible, but it can only be done if the electricity produced by coal is replaced. The replacements available for that purpose are natural gas, renewable energy, and nuclear power. These all have issues and risks, but are far cleaner and with fewer health consequences than coal. There are many interesting developments that will allow nuclear power to be safer, produce less waste, and even use up the existing nuclear waste. Bill Gates is promoting a company called TerraPower, developing the Traveling Wave Reactor. Environmentalist Stewart Brand, editor of the Whole Earth Catalog, supports nuclear power and the development of integral fast reactors that use uranium more efficiently and can use waste from other reactors. James Hansen, a leading climate scientist and now an activist, also supports third- and fourth-generation nuclear reactors as a way to avert climate change. The projections from a variety of sources depict that CO2 emissions will decline slowly in the United States and likely continue to increase around the world — so pretty much a “business-as-usual” scenario. A report by PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Too late for two degrees,” shows that in 2001 the world energy related emissions grew by 3 percent. China’s emissions grew by 9.4 percent, but emissions in the United States dropped by 1.9 percent, in part due to a mild winter. The most revealing and useful metric is the CO2 measurements taken at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii since 1959. Based on the trend of the CO2 measurements over the past 20 years, the atmospheric CO2 level — currently at 396 ppm (parts per million) — will reach 450 ppm in 2034. This is approximately the level of CO2 where the average global temperature will increase by 2 degrees (3.6 degrees F) over the pre-industrial level. Based on the latest climate change science, disruptive climate change is occurring now and will continue to occur with increased warming. That part is certain. What is uncertain is the intensity and timing of the transition to dangerous climate change, the threshold which is thought to be 2 degrees C of warming over the pre-industrial level. According to a report published in November 2012 by the World Bank, titled “Turn Down the Heat — Why a 4℃ Warmer World Must be Avoided,” if the current commitments and pledges for reducing emissions are not fully implemented, warming of 4 degrees C (7.2 degrees F) could occur as early as the 2060s. This level of warming will likely produce enormous environmental harm, as well as social and economic disruption. I encourage everyone to download and read this World Bank report. We need a greater understanding and appreciation of the magnitude of the projected harm that dangerous climate change can cause. People will adapt to climate change, but that adaptation will include migration and displacement that is orders of magnitude greater than that caused by the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear facility disaster. That adaptation will include the abandonment of large cities flooded by a rising sea and migration from regions parched by drought. The warming and CO2 levels will last for centuries and change the world ecosystems. To postpone or avert the greatest harm from climate change it is necessary to accept the risks and potential harm that come with nuclear power, renewable energy, and natural gas, because the alternative is so much worse. The environmentalist positions against the energy technologies that offer effective solutions for replacement of coal are not helpful. As stated in the World Bank report: “The projected 4℃ warming must not be allowed to occur — the heat must be turned down.”

#### Financing chains key to emissions mitigation via the developing world, avoids 4 degrees

Kim, 2012 (Dr. Jim Yong, President of the World Bank Group, “Turn Down The heat: why a 4°C warmer world must be avoided”, November, World Bank, http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn\_Down\_the\_heat\_Why\_a\_4\_degree\_centrigrade\_warmer\_world\_must\_be\_avoided.pdf)

A 4°C world can, and must, be avoided. The World Bank Group will continue to be a strong advocate for international and regional agreements and increasing climate financing. We will redouble our efforts to support fast growing national initiatives to mitigate carbon emissions and build adaptive capacity as well as support inclusive green growth and climate smart development. Our work on inclusive green growth has shown that—through more efficiency and smarter use of energy and natural resources—many opportunities exist to drastically reduce the climate impact of development, without slowing down poverty alleviation and economic growth. This report is a stark reminder that climate change affects everything. The solutions don’t lie only in climate finance or climate projects. The solutions lie in effective risk management and ensuring all our work, all our thinking, is designed with the threat of a 4°C degree world in mind. The World Bank Group will step up to the challenge.

#### Other sources fail

Cohen, 2012

[Armond, Executive Director, Clean Air Task Force, 2-13, “Decarbonization: The Nuclear Option,” http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/02/is-america-poised-for-nuclear.php?print=true&printcomment=2161670]

Just on its face, this is a tall order. The capital investment is jaw-dropping, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to site new energy projects, regardless of whether they are solar or wind farms, transmission lines, CCS infrastructure, shale gas drilling, or nuclear facilities. More subtly, integrating these various energy sources—especially balancing output of intermittent renewables in an electric grid with no significant ability to store energy—is a major challenge; it is far from certain it can even be done at very large scale. To maximize our odds of meeting the target, we will need to prioritize development and deployment of technologies that appear capable of growing economically to full scale.Cheap unscrubbed natural gas is a “McSolution” to the problem—tempting, but probably not the healthiest long-term choice. In order to make a major contribution to climate abatement, methane emissions from natural gas production and distribution will need to be reduced, and gas-fired power plants will need to use CCS technologies. And, although gas in the United States today is sold at prices below production costs, that cannot continue for long, especially in increasingly international markets. Similarly**,** “soft energy paths” like PV power (also sometimes today sold below cost) will need significant grid support and zero-carbon balancing to generate meaningful emission reductions. The economic supply curve for large, attractive sites for these projects is bound to bend sharply upwards over time as well. In this context, nuclear power has potentially significant advantages to offer: It is demonstrably low-carbon; it provides baseload energy; unlike wind and solar, it has high power density; and, although gas is cheap today, the price of new nuclear power appears to approach that of new coal. Perhaps more importantly, the price of new nuclear plants will decline as years pass. Standardization will lead to some cost reductions; factory assembly of small, modular units could bring about further step-change reductions (as it has for automobiles and airplanes) in production costs. None of this means that nuclear is poised for a renaissance in the United States. Utilities and their regulators won’t argue with $3 gas, Congress is unwilling to put a price on carbon, and some people remain vehemently opposed to nuclear energy. Ultimately, however, nuclear energy isprobably an indispensible element of any credible plan to substantially decarbonize the country. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s recent approval of the new Westinghouse reactor design is good news in this regard, as it should help revitalize the American nuclear industry and keep it moving on a path of continuous improvement. In the longer term, a host of newer technologies, including passively cooled small reactors, gas-cooled reactors, and reactors with liquid fuels offer significant potential for further improvements in cost and safety. The country would do well to support continued development and deployment of these designs. In an ideal world, we might wait to scale up nuclear power until after we’ve exhausted all efficiency and renewables options. Unfortunately, however, we don’t have decades to do this, even if we thought traditional green sources would eventually fill the zero-carbon void, which seems unrealistic. Half of the CO2 emitted today will still be warming the planet 1,000 years from now, and these legacy emissions won’t erase themselves. We need to develop all low-carbon energy options now to hedge against the risk of serious climate consequences; nuclear power, despite its genuine challenges, cannot be left off the table.

### Contention Three: Warming Outweighs

#### Uncertainty means vote aff – at 4 degrees, our ability to predict exactly what will happen and adapt is minimal

Kim, 2012 (Dr. Jim Yong, President of the World Bank Group, “Turn Down The heat: why a 4°C warmer world must be avoided”, November, World Bank, http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn\_Down\_the\_heat\_Why\_a\_4\_degree\_centrigrade\_warmer\_world\_must\_be\_avoided.pdf)

It is my hope that this report shocks us into action. Even for those of us already committed to fighting climate change, I hope it causes us to work with much more urgency. This report spells out what the world would be like if it warmed by 4 degrees Celsius, which is what scientists are nearly unanimously predicting by the end of the century, without serious policy changes. The 4°C scenarios are devastating: the inundation of coastal cities; increasing risks for food production potentially leading to higher malnutrition rates; many dry regions becoming dryer, wet regions wetter; unprecedented heat waves in many regions, especially in the tropics; substantially exacerbated water scarcity in many regions; increased frequency of high-intensity tropical cyclones; and irreversible loss of biodiversity, including coral reef systems. And most importantly, a 4°C world is so different from the current one that it comes with high uncertainty and new risks that threaten our ability to anticipate and plan for future adaptation needs. The lack of action on climate change not only risks putting prosperity out of reach of millions of people in the developing world, it threatens to roll back decades of sustainable development. It is clear that we already know a great deal about the threat before us. The science is unequivocal that humans are the cause of global warming, and major changes are already being observed: global mean warming is 0.8°C above pre industrial levels; oceans have warmed by 0.09°C since the 1950s and are acidifying; sea levels rose by about 20 cm since pre-industrial times and are now rising at 3.2 cm per decade; an exceptional number of extreme heat waves occurred in the last decade; major food crop growing areas are increasingly affected by drought. Despite the global community’s best intentions to keep global warming below a 2°C increase above pre-industrial climate, higher levels of warming are increasingly likely. Scientists agree that countries’ current United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change emission pledges and commitments would most likely result in 3.5 to 4°C warming. And the longer those pledges remain unmet, the more likely a 4°C world becomes. Data and evidence drive the work of the World Bank Group. Science reports, including those produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, informed our decision to ramp up work on these issues, leading to, a World Development Report on climate change designed to improve our understanding of the implications of a warming planet; a Strategic Framework on Development and Climate Change, and a report on Inclusive Green Growth. The World Bank is a leading advocate for ambitious action on climate change, not only because it is a moral imperative, but because it makes good economic sense. But what if we fail to ramp up efforts on mitigation? What are the implications of a 4°C world? We commissioned this report from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics to help us understand the state of the science and the potential impact on development in such a world. It would be so dramatically different from today’s world that it is hard to describe accurately; much relies on complex projections and interpretations. We are well aware of the uncertainty that surrounds these scenarios and we know that different scholars and studies sometimes disagree on the degree of risk. But the fact that such scenarios cannot be discarded is sufficient to justify strengthening current climate change policies. Finding ways to avoid that scenario is vital for the health and welfare of communities around the world. While every region of the world will be affected, the poor and most vulnerable would be hit hardest. A 4°C world can, and must, be avoided. The World Bank Group will continue to be a strong advocate for international and regional agreements and increasing climate financing. We will redouble our efforts to support fast growing national initiatives to mitigate carbon emissions and build adaptive capacity as well as support inclusive green growth and climate smart development. Our work on inclusive green growth has shown that—through more efficiency and smarter use of energy and natural resources—many opportunities exist to drastically reduce the climate impact of development, without slowing down poverty alleviation and economic growth. This report is a stark reminder that climate change affects everything. The solutions don’t lie only in climate finance or climate projects. The solutions lie in effective risk management and ensuring all our work, all our thinking, is designed with the threat of a 4°C degree world in mind. The World Bank Group will step up to the challenge.

#### No great power war – organizations, alliances, diplomacy

Robb 12—Lieutenant, US Navy (Doug, Why the Age of Great Power War is Over, [www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/now-hear-why-age-great-power-war-over](http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/now-hear-why-age-great-power-war-over), CMR)

Whereas in years past, when nations allied with their neighbors in ephemeral bonds of convenience, today’s global politics are tempered by permanent international organizations, regional military alliances, and formal economic partnerships. Thanks in large part to the prevalence of liberal democracies, these groups are able to moderate international disputes and provide forums for nations to air grievances, assuage security concerns, and negotiate settlements—thereby making war a distant (and distasteful) option. As a result, China (and any other global power) has much to lose by flouting international opinion, as evidenced by its advocacy of the recent Syrian uprising, which has drawn widespread condemnation.¶ In addition to geopolitical and diplomacy issues, globalization continues to transform the world. This interdependence has blurred the lines between economic security and physical security. Increasingly, great-power interests demand cooperation rather than conflict. To that end, maritime nations such as the United States and China desire open sea lines of communication and protected trade routes, a common security challenge that could bring these powers together, rather than drive them apart (witness China’s response to the issue of piracy in its backyard). Facing these security tasks cooperatively is both mutually advantageous and common sense.¶ Democratic Peace Theory—championed by Thomas Paine and international relations theorists such as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman—presumes that great-power war will likely occur between a democratic and non-democratic state. However, as information flows freely and people find outlets for and access to new ideas, authoritarian leaders will find it harder to cultivate popular support for total war—an argument advanced by philosopher Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace.”¶ Consider, for example, China’s unceasing attempts to control Internet access. The 2011 Arab Spring demonstrated that organized opposition to unpopular despotic rule has begun to reshape the political order, a change galvanized largely by social media. Moreover, few would argue that China today is not socially more liberal, economically more capitalistic, and governmentally more inclusive than during Mao Tse-tung’s regime. As these trends continue, nations will find large-scale conflict increasingly disagreeable.¶ In terms of the military, ongoing fiscal constraints and socio-economic problems likely will marginalize defense issues. All the more reason why great powers will find it mutually beneficial to work together to find solutions to common security problems, such as countering drug smuggling, piracy, climate change, human trafficking, and terrorism—missions that Admiral Robert F. Willard, former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, called “deterrence and reassurance.”¶ As the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a formidable deterrent against unlimited war. They make conflict irrational; in other words, the concept of mutually assured destruction—however unpalatable—actually had a stabilizing effect on both national behaviors and nuclear policies for decades. These tools thus render great-power war infinitely less likely by guaranteeing catastrophic results for both sides. As Bob Dylan warned, “When you ain’t got nothing, you ain’t got nothing to lose.”¶ Great-power war is not an end in itself, but rather a way for nations to achieve their strategic aims. In the current security environment, such a war is equal parts costly, counterproductive, archaic, and improbable.

#### No nuclear war – deterrence

Tepperman 2009 [Deputy Editor at Newsweek. Frmr Deputy Managing Editor, Foreign Affairs. LLM, i-law, NYU. MA, jurisprudence, Oxford. (Jonathan, Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb, <http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome_files/nukes_Final.pdf>, CMR]

The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there’s never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it’s hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading “nuclear optimist” and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, “We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that **all states are rational** on some basic level. **Their leaders** may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they **tend to do things** only when **they’re** pretty **sure they can get away with** them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it’s almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn’t think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button— and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziesttin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, “Why fight if you can’t win and might lose everything?” Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world’s major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight **proxy wars**, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these **never matched** the furious destruction of full-on, **great-power war** (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there’s very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both **countries** soon **stepped back** from the brink **when they recognized** that **a war would** have **mean**t curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, “It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time.” The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: **nuclear** armed **enemies** slide toward war, then **pull back**, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn’t do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other’s vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials’ thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.

#### Miscalc is impossible

Quinlan 2009 (Sir Michael, visiting professor at King's College London, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence and former senior fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, “Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects,” Oxford University Press, CMR)

One special form of miscalculation appeared sporadically in the speculations of academic commentators, though it was scarcely ever to be encountered—at least so far as my own observation went—in the utterances of practical planners within government. This is the idea that nuclear war might be erroneously triggered, or erroneously widened, through a state under attack misreading either what sort of attack it was being subjected to, or where the attack came from. The postulated misreading of the nature of the attack referred in particular to the hypothesis that if a delivery system—normally a missile—that was known to be capable of carrying either a nuclear or a conventional warhead was launched in a conventional role, the target country might, on detecting the launch through its early warning systems, misconstrue the mission as an imminent nuclear strike and immediately unleash a nuclear counter-strike of its own. This conjecture was voiced, for example, as a criticism of the proposals for giving the US Trident SLBM, long associated with nuclear missions, a capability to deliver conventional warheads. Whatever the merit of those proposals (it is not explored here), it is hard to regard this particular apprehension as having any real-life credibility. The ﬂight time of a ballistic missile would not exceed about thirty minutes, and that of a cruise missile a few hours, before arrival on target made its character—conventional or nuclear—unmistakable. No government will need, and no nonlunatic government could wish, to take within so short a span of time a step as enormous and irrevocable as the execution of a nuclear strike on the basis of early-warning information alone without knowing the true nature of the incoming attack. The speculation tends moreover to be expressed without reference either to any realistic political or conﬂict-related context thought to render the episode plausible, or to the manifest interest of the launching country, should there be any risk of doubt, in ensuring—by explicit communication if necessary—that there was no misinterpretation of its conventionally armed launch.

#### Interdependence checks

Deudney 2009 (Daniel Prof of Pol Sci, and Ikenberry, Prof of International Affairs, and John, Prof of Pol Sci at John Hopkins and Prof of International Affairs at Princeton, “Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail” <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/events/csf/readings/AutocraticRevival.aspx>, CMR)

This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignorespowerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what the revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities — of pushes and pulls — that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together**,** these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge.

#### Nuclear war doesn’t cause extinction

Socol 2011Yehoshua (Ph.D.), an inter-disciplinary physicist, is an expert in electro-optics, high-energy physics and applications, and material science and Moshe Yanovskiy, Jan 2, “Nuclear Proliferation and Democracy”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/01/nuclear\_proliferation\_and\_demo.html, CMR

Nuclear proliferation should no longer be treated as an unthinkable nightmare; it is likely to be the future reality. Nuclear weapons have been acquired not only by an extremely poor per capita but large country such as India, but also by even poorer and medium-sized nations such as Pakistan and North Korea. One could also mention South Africa, which successfully acquired a nuclear arsenal despite economic sanctions (the likes of which have not yet been imposed on Iran). It is widely believed that sanctions and rhetoric will not prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and that many countries, in the Middle East and beyond, will act accordingly (see, e.g., recent Heritage report). Nuclear Warfare -- Myths And Facts The direct **consequences of** the limited **use of** **nuclear weapons** -- especially low-yield devices most likely to be in the hands of non-state actors or irresponsible governments -- **would** probably **not be great** enough to bring about significant geopolitical upheavals. Casualties from a single 20-KT nuclear device **are** estimated [1] at about 25,000 fatalities with a similar number of injured, assuming a rather unfortunate scenario (the center of a large city, with minimal warning). Scaling the above toll to larger devices or to a larger number of devices is less than linear. For example, it has been estimated that it would take as many as eighty devices of 20-KT yield each to cause 300,000 civilian fatalities in German cities (a result actually achieved by Allied area attacks, or carpet-bombings, during the Second World War). A single 1-MT device used against Detroit has been estimated by U.S. Congress OTA to result in about 220,000 fatalities. It is anticipated that well-prepared **civil defense measures**, based on rather simple presently known techniques, would **decrease** these **numbers by** maybe **an order of magnitude** (as will be discussed later). There is little doubt that **a nation determined to survive** and with a strong sense of its own destiny **would not succumb to** such **losses**. It is often argued that the **fallout** effects of even the limited use of nuclear weapons would be worldwide and would last for generations. This **is** an exaggeration. The following facts speak for themselves. -- **In Japan**, as assessed by REFR, **less than 1,000** excess **cancer cases** (i.e., above the natural occurrence) **were recorded in** over **100,000 survivors** over the past sixty years -- compared with about 110,000 immediate fatalities in the two atomic bombings. No clinical or even sub-clinical effects were discovered in the survivors' offspring. -- In the Chernobyl area, as assessed by IAEA, only fifteen cancer deaths can be directly attributed to fallout radiation. No radiation-related increase in congenital formations was recorded. Nuclear Conflict -- Possible Scenarios With reference to a possible regional nuclear conflict between a rogue state and a democratic one, the no-winner (mutual assured destruction) scenario is probably false. An analysis by Anthony Cordesman, et al. regarding a possible Israel-Iran nuclear conflict estimated that while Israel might survive an Iranian nuclear blow, Iran would certainly not survive as an organized society. Even though the projected casualties cited in that study seem to us overstated, especially as regards Israel, the conclusion rings true. **Due to the** extreme high **intensity** ("above-conventional") of **nuclear conflict**, it is nearly certain that such a war, no matter its outcome, would not lastfor years**,** as we have become accustomed to in current low-intensity conflicts. Rather, we should **anticipate** a new geo-political reality: the emergence of clear **winners** and losers within several days, or at most weeks after the initial outbreak of hostilities. This latter reality will most probably contain fewer nuclear-possessing states than the former.

**No nuke winter – studies**

Seitz 2011 (Russell, Harvard University Center for International Affairs visiting scholar, “Nuclear winter was and is debatable,” Nature, 7-7-11, Vol 475, pg37, accessed 9-27-11, CMR)

Alan Robock's contention that there has been no real scientific debate about the 'nuclear winter' concept is itself debatable (Nature 473, 275–276; 2011). This **potential climate disaster**, popularized in Science in 1983, **rested on** the output of **a one-dimensional model that** was later shown to **overestimate** the smoke a nuclear holocaust might engender. More refined estimates, combined with advanced three-dimensional models (see http://go.nature.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/kss8te), have dramatically reduced the extent and severity of the projected cooling. Despite this, Carl Sagan, who co-authored the 1983 Science paper, went so far as to posit “the extinction of Homo sapiens” (C. Sagan Foreign Affairs 63, 75–77; 1984). **Some regarded this** apocalyptic **prediction as** **an exercise in mythology**. George **Rathjens of** the Massachusetts Institute of Technology **protested: “Nuclear winter is** **the worst example of the misrepresentation of science** to the public **in my memory**,” (see http://go.nature.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/yujz84) and **climatologist** Kerry **Emanuel** observed that the subject had **“**become **notorious** for its **lack of scientific integrity”** (Nature 319, 259; 1986). Robock's single-digit fall in temperature is at odds with the subzero (about −25 °C) continental cooling originally projected for a wide spectrum of nuclear wars. Whereas Sagan predicted darkness at noon from a US–Soviet nuclear conflict, Robock projects global sunlight that is several orders of magnitude brighter for a Pakistan–India conflict — literally the difference between night and day. Since 1983, **the** projected **worst-case** cooling has fallen from a Siberian deep freeze spanning 11,000 degree-days Celsius (a measure of the severity of winters) to **numbers** so unseasonably small as to **call** the very term **'nuclear winter' into question**.

## 2AC

### Fukushima

**No Turns Case arg – accidents affect everyone differently and merely cause an increased focus on safety – Fukushima proves**

**Domenici and Miller, 2012** (Pete, former senator and senior fellow at the Bipartisan Policy Center; Warren F, PhD in Engineering Sciences from Northwestern and recently served as assistant secretary for nuclear energy at the U.S. Department of Energy; “Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets”, Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Nuclear Initiative, July, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Leadership%20in%20Nuclear%20Energy%20Markets.pdf)

Internationally, the outlook is quite different: a number of countries intend to grow their nuclear fleet or enter the market for nuclear technology for the first time. **Though enthusiasm for nuclear investments has been somewhat dimmed by the Fukushima accident, there still seems to be substantial international interest** **in the further deployment of nuclear power**. In 2008, when the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) last conducted its Nuclear Energy Outlook, it analyzed global growth scenarios ranging from 450 to 600 gigawatts of electricity through nuclear capacity by 2050, taking into account existing capacity and new additions. 14 Several years later, the lower-end projection seems more likely given the impacts of the worldwide economic crisis and the impacts of the Fukushima accident. 15 In fact, **Fukushima has caused, appropriately, an international pause as each country with existing or planned nuclear capacity takes time to reassess the safety of its currently operating plants and to review its commitment to future nuclear energy development**. **Some countries**—Germany is a prominent example—**have reversed course on their nuclear energy programs**. In March 2011, Germany’s 17 reactors generated approximately 25 percent of that country’s electricity supply. After Fukushima, the German government immediately shut down eight reactors and reinstated its policy of phasing out nuclear energy altogether by 2022. 16 Italy and Switzerland have made similar decisions to phase out or delay the growth of their nuclear programs. 17 After Fukushima, the Japanese government reversed its policy goal of expanding nuclear power to 30 to 40 percent of electric generation. 18 As of May 2012, all 54 of Japan’s nuclear power reactors had been shut down for scheduled maintenance; due to public opposition, to date, only one of these plants has been able to restart. 19,20 **Several other countries, by contrast, have reaffirmed their intentions to continue expanding or developing a nuclear energy program after Fukushima.** **These countries include China, India, South Korea, and Russia. Together, they are expected to account for 80 percent of new nuclear plant construction globally over the next decade** or longer. China alone accounts for 40 percent of planned new construction globally, with 26 new reactors under development. 21 **Thus, global growth in nuclear energy is still expected to be positive overall.**

### CP

#### Perm do both

#### CP Doesn’t solve – The US is seen as a dishonest broker – we still threaten to attack anyone for proliferating which is intrinsically tied to enrichment and reprocessing – the Squassoni and Davidson evidence indicates that deters development of a nuclear power industry

#### Conditionality bad

#### Countries want domestic nuclear tech – they’ll say no to shared ENR

Pomper and Varnum, 2013 (Miles and Jessica, “Future of Enrichment ‘Gold Standard’ in Doubt After U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Deal”, World Politics Review, October 21, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13315/future-of-enrichment-gold-standard-in-doubt-after-u-s-vietnam-nuclear-deal)

In reaction, U.S. President George W. Bush called for the United States and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to “refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants.” Previous NSG rules simply urged members to exercise restraint in such transfers. The international community, however, was sharply divided. Many NPT non-nuclear weapon states argued that the treaty granted them an inalienable right to pursue ENR technologies under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Several NSG members, including Turkey and Brazil, shared this perspective, and successfully watered down U.S.-led reform efforts. Nor does comprehensive multilateral control of the fuel cycle appeal to many nuclear weapon states, who would have to surrender national control of ENR facilities, or non-nuclear weapon states, who perceive most proposals as discriminatory. Instead, states have approved a baby step toward multilateral control, a nuclear fuel bank to assure countries of a backup supply in case of market interruptions, obviating the need for states with supply security concerns to build their own enrichment facilities.

#### U.S.-led warming push fails – trades off with regional solutions without creating a sustainable market

Michael Levi, Senior Fellow, Energy and Envirronment et al., "Globalizing the Energy Revolution," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, November/December 2010

The success of other nations in clean energy does not imply U.S. failure. The United States can benefit greatly from clean-energy innovation around the world, so long as it also pursues its own robust efforts at home. Each major economy has its own natural advantages when it comes to energy technology innovation and development. An enlightened U.S. strategy should aim to create a global innovation environment that weaves together those distinct strengths in pursuit of common energy goals. Not everyone will like every part of the package. Some U.S. firms will chafe at efforts that might help competitors in the developing world. Some emerging economies will resist opening up their markets to those same U.S. firms. Only by enlarging clean-energy markets can everyone enjoy a bigger piece of the pie. The alternative is not a world in which the United States dominates the clean-energy field alone, or even one in which another country solves the United States' problems for it. It is more likely to be one in which the cost of clean energy does not drop as quickly as needed, particularly in the developing world, and in which massive markets for clean-energy technologies do not materialize. In that case, the United States and the world will both lose.

#### US can’t fill in – end of Russia sharing; decaying infrastructure. New enrichment capabilities are key

Wald 12-4

[Matthew, New York Times, “Ebb in Uranium Enrichment in U.S. Raises Questions About Nuclear Policy”, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/us/politics/ebb-in-uranium-enrichment-in-us-raises-questions.html?\_r=0]

The United States does not need enrichment to make any new nuclear weapons, because it already has thousands of them. But the United States could lose the ability to maintain its nuclear arsenal, many experts say, because its nuclear infrastructure is withering. The last American factory for enriching uranium that used American technology closed in May. It was a victim, after 60 years, of changing technologies and economics — some of it resulting from the Megatons to Megawatts program, which provided the enrichment needs for half of the civilian nuclear industry. That plant was operated by USEC, a private company in Bethesda, Md. Now, USEC, with extensive government support, is developing a new kind of centrifuge that would have a military role by making low-enriched fuel for a Tennessee Valley Authority civilian reactor that produces a component of nuclear weapons. USEC, which was formerly known as the U.S. Enrichment Corporation, was a government enterprise that was spun off to the private sector in 1998. It has been trying for years to find a toehold in the centrifuge business, but it has struggled against technologically advanced and well-financed foreign competitors. The new USEC centrifuges would primarily produce fuel for civilian reactors, which use low-enriched fuel that is unsuitable for bombs.

### Flex

#### They have to win there are wars that we need to fight – multiple factors – Allies, diplomacy, International Organizations, Deterrence, Interdependence and cushioning all ensure it won’t happen – That’s Robb, Tepperman, Duedney and Quinlan

#### Nuclear war not cause extinction – not enough fallout and the war would end within days – that’s Seitz and Socol

#### We Control Link UQ - Legislative constraints are inevitable – only question is whether approval takes place

Barron and Lederman, 2008 (David, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School; Martin, Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center; “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – A Constitutional History”, Harvard Law Review, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis)

In a companion Article, we described many of the structural forces responsible for this shift in the ground of debate. n2 Collectively, they strongly suggest that the prevailing paradigm of congressional abdication - developed at a time when bold claims of presidential authority to act without express legislative approval occasioned all the attention - no longer illuminates the main battle lines in constitutional struggles over the exercise of war powers. Among the most important of these forces is the peculiar nature of the war on terrorism. Its unusual entwinement with the home front, its heavy focus on preemptive action and intelligence collection, and its targeting of a diffuse, non-state enemy, all guarantee that presidential uses of force are likely to be conducted for years to come in a context that is thick with statutory restrictions. But even beyond the war on terrorism, the "lowest ebb" issue is likely to take on added significance, if only because of the increased willingness of Presidents to deploy force abroad. There is mounting evidence that the reduction in legislative participation at the front end of these conflicts is being counterbalanced to some extent by a legislative willingness to intervene at the back end if the campaign goes poorly or if the public begins to doubt certain of the President's decisions about how it should be prosecuted.

#### The DA is wrong – presidents can’t act quickly and congressional action solves

Pearlstein, 2009 (Deborah, Visiting Scholar and Lecturer in Public and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs at Princeton University; “Form and Function in the National Security Constitution”, Connecticut Law Review, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1549, Lexis)

This brings us to the new functionalists' role effectiveness approach. For whatever one researcher (especially, the new functionalists would suggest, legal researchers) might find in the empirical literature informing the nature of security threats and emergency responses, the new functionalists' more forthright argument is that institutional competences make the executive better positioned to consider this information and make decisions accordingly. Indeed, in a linear comparison of institutional competences, the differences among the branches that flow from institutional structure are of course real. The judiciary, for example, can only act in the event of a case or controversy. The administrative agency and national security apparatus may put information, in the first instance, in the hands of the executive rather than Congress or the courts. Moreover, the new functionalists add, the judiciary lacks the expertise and the procedural and evidentiary resources to make good judgments in an emergency; judicial resources are too scarce to require individualized determinations as to many hundreds or thousands of detainees it is assumed, as a matter of raw effectiveness, it will be necessary to detain. And given its own resource constraints and motives, the executive is [\*1598] unlikely to exaggerate the danger posed by an individual, or detain too many people. n168 Accordingly, the new functionalists tend to favor a decision- making structure with loose (if any), emergency-driven congressional engagement and deferential (if any) judicial review. But such comparative competence accounts are misleading in several ways. They ignore the complexity of current government decision-making structures. The vast executive branch decision-making apparatus means decisions rarely come down to the speed possible with one man acting alone, and Congress and the courts have at their institutional disposal multiple means to enable the sharing of information among the branches. Such accounts also critically ignore the possibility of collective organizational capacity, a notion Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence seemed squarely to contemplate. n169 The executive acting alone may be better than the courts acting alone in some circumstances, but the executive plus the courts (or Congress) may be more effective than the executive alone. Perhaps most important, the new functionalist role effectiveness view ignores the structural reality that national security policy (indeed all government decision- making) is channeled through a set of existing organizations, each with its own highly elaborated set of professional norms and responsibilities, standard procedures and routines, identities and culture, all of which constrain and guide behavior-often in ways that centrally affect the organization's ability to perform its functions. Considering how such pathologies affect decision-making, one may find a far more sophisticated-and more meaningful-set of comparisons between decision-making structures than asking, for example, whether the executive can make decisions faster than courts. The next section explores a role effectiveness approach that could take this reality into account.

### Prolif

#### Ridiculous impact – empirically denied – countries have proliferated in the past

#### err aff – posturing doesn’t prevent proliferation

Mueller, 2008 (John, Dept of Political Science at Ohio State University, “The Costs and Consequences of Efforts to Prevent Proliferation”, July 16, http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//apsa08.pdf)

It may be time, then, to reconsider the "supreme priority" approach to nuclear proliferation. It would certainly be preferable that a number of variously designated regimes (and quite a few others) ever obtain nuclear weapons. But if they do so they are by far most likely to put them to use--if that is the term--the same way other nuclear countries have: to stoke their collective egos and to deter real or perceived threats. Proliferation alarmists (a category which seems to embrace almost the totality of the foreign policy establishment) may occasionally grant that countries principally obtain a nuclear arsenal to counter real or perceived threats. But many go on to argue that the newly nuclear country will then use its nuclear weapons to dominate the area. This argument was repeatedly used with dramatic urgency by Kenneth Pollack and many others for the dangers to world peace and order supposedly posed by Saddam Hussein, and it is now being dusted off and applied to Iran. Exactly how this domination business is to be carried out is never make very clear. The United States possesses a tidy array of thousands of nuclear weapons and can't even dominate downtown Baghdad--or even keep the lights on there. But the notion apparently is that should an atomic Iraq (in earlier fantasies) or North Korea or Iran (in present ones) rattle the occasional rocket, all other countries in the area, suitably intimidated, would supinely bow to its demands. Far more likely is that any threatened states will make common cause with each other against the threatening neighbor, perhaps enlisting the convenient aid eagerly proffered by other countries probably including the United States and conceivably even, in the case of Iran, Israel. Cirincione paints a much darker picture. He thinks a nuclear Iran or North Korea could readily be deterred from using a nuclear weapon against their neighbors or the United States, and he discounts the likelihood either might "intentionally give a weapon to a terrorist group they could not control." What sets Cirincione off instead is an extravagant fear cascade which envisions "a nuclear chain reaction where states feel they must match each other's nuclear capability," something "underway already in the Middle East where a dozen Muslim nations suddenly declared interest in starting nuclear-power programs" which, he asserts, are a "nuclear hedge against Iran" (or, one might add, against the United States). This, continues Cirincione, "could lead to a Middle East with not one nuclear-weapons state, Israel, but four or five," and that, he concludes, "is a recipe for nuclear war."97 President Bush is more blunt, but equally fanciful: "if you're interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing [Iran] from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon."98 Following this imaginative chain of logic, and it becomes clear that, if North Korea and Iran cannot be stopped by lesser means from getting a bomb (or in Bush's terms even from acquiring the knowledge of how to do so), the world has no choice but to apply military force to stop them, killing in the process thousands, or even tens or hundreds of thousands, of people. All this to avoid finding out if the extreme imaginings have any substance.99 If a leader of a state is determined to obtain a nuclear capacity, dedicated antiproliferators have choice of two policy options: 1) let him have it, or, in distinct contrast, 2) let him have it. Under the first option, antiproliferators might seek to make things difficult and costly for the nuclear aspirant, but in the end they would stand back and let the undesirable development come about, trusting (or hoping) that the new nuclear country could be kept in line by deterrence even as they remain mindful of historical experience which strongly suggests that new nuclear countries--even ones that once seemed to be hugely threatening like China in 1964--have been content to use their weapons for purposes of prestige and deterrence. Under the second option, antiproliferators, under the influence of imaginings about dire things that could conceivably transpire should the nuclear aspirant succeed, would desperately apply military action or sanctions against the determined nuclear aspirant, policies that will inevitably result in the deaths of a very considerable number of people, quite possible more than have been killed by all the nuclear explosions in all of history. This paper warns against the second of these, and recommends the first. "It is dangerous," muses Jacques Hymans aptly, "to fight smoke with fire."100 Nuclear proliferation, while not necessarily desirable, is unlikely to accelerate or prove to be a major danger. And extreme policies based, however logically, on worst case fantasies about proliferation need careful reconsideration.101 They can generate costs far higher than those likely to be generated by the potential (and often imaginary) problems they seek to address.

#### No impact to prolif

Tepperman 9—Deputy Editor at Newsweek. Frmr Deputy Managing Editor, Foreign Affairs. LLM, i-law, NYU. MA, jurisprudence, Oxford. (Jonathan, Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb, http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome\_files/nukes\_Final.pdf)

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that’s a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama’s idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it’s not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn’t be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nukefree planet) that’s both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there’s never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it’s hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading “nuclear optimist” and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, “We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they’re pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it’s almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn’t think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button— and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, “Why fight if you can’t win and might lose everything?” Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world’s major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there’s very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, “It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time.” The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nucleararmed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn’t do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other’s vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials’ thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it. Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it’s crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today’s nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you’d be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who’s never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes —and there’s no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to “bury” the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn’t be so bad because even “if half of mankind died . . . the whole world would become socialist.” Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real recordholders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today’s international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad’s antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn’t win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.

#### --Proliferation creates peace – solves conventional and nuclear war – conventional conflict is more likely and escalates – their ‘rationality’ and instability args all empirically disproven

Kenneth N. **Waltz** is the Emeritus Ford **Professor of Political Science at** the University of California at **Berkeley** and senior research associate at Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. In 1999 he won the James Madison Lifetime Achievement Award from the American Political Science Association., “Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option? Waltz Says No”, Sept-Oct 20**10**, <http://nationalinterest.org/greatdebate/yes-3950>, CMR

WITH THE dawn of the nuclear age, peace has prevailed among those who have the weapons or enjoy their protection. **Those who like peace should love nuclear weapons**. They are the only weapons ever invented that work decisively against their own use. Those who advocate a zero option argue in effect that we should eliminate the cause of the extensive peace the nuclear world has enjoyed. India and Pakistan provide an object lesson. When they tested their warheads in May of 1998, journalists, academics and public officials predicted that war and chaos on the subcontinent would ensue. The result, as I expected, was to ensure a prolonged peace between countries that had fought three wars since independence and continued for a time to spill blood in the conflict over Kashmir. That countries with nuclear capabilities do not fight wars against one another is a lesson we should have learned. The proposition has held exactly where the prospects for war seemed the brightest, for example, between the United States and the Soviet Union, between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, and between India and Pakistan. New nuclear states are often greeted with dire forebodings: Is the government stable? Are the rulers sensible? The answers may be disconcerting. Yet every new nuclear nation, **however bad its previous reputation**, has behaved **exactly like all of the old ones.** The effect of having nuclear weapons overwhelms the character of the states that possess them. Countries with nuclear weapons, no matter how mean and irrational their leaders may seem to be, no matter how unstable their governments appear to be, do not launch major conventional attacks on other countries, let alone nuclear ones. Even conventional attacks can all too easily escalate out of control and **lead to an exchange of nuclear warheads**. With conventional weapons, countries worry about winning or losing. With nuclear weapons, countries worry about surviving or **being annihilated**. Nuclear weapons induce caution all around: think of the Cuban missile crisis, or think of the external behavior of China during the frightful decade of the Cultural Revolution.

#### Curbing nuclear prolif causes a shift to bioweapons.

**Zilinskas 2k—**Former Clinical Microbiologist. Dir. – Chem/Bio Weapons Nonproliferation Program – Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (Raymond, Biological warfare: modern offense and defense, 1-2, AMiles)

It is an odd characteristic of biological weapons that military generals tend to view them with distaste, but civilian bioscientists often have lobbied for their development and deployment. There are, of course, understandable reasons for this oddity; generals find that these weapons do not fit neatly into tactical or strategic military doctrines of attack or defense, whereas researchers have observed that transforming microbes into weapons presents interesting scientific challenges whose solution governments have been willing to pay well for. Another oddity is that whenever biological weapons have been employed in battle, they have proven militarily ineffectual, yet bellicose national leaders persevere in seeking to acquire them. There is also a facile explanation for this anomaly, namely, that although pathogens are all too willing to invade prospective hosts, human ingenuity so far has failed to devise reliable methods for effectively conveying a large number of pathogens to the population targeted for annihilation by disease. This repeated failure has not deterred leaders; again and again they become allured by the potential destructive power of biological weapons. Perhaps trusting science too much, they direct government scientists to develop them, believing that this time a usable weapon of mass destruction will be achieved. Their belief so far has been thwarted, but is it possible that within the foreseeable future the potential of biological weapons will be realized and that the effect of a biological bomb, missile, or aerosolized cloud can be as readily predetermined as that of a bomb or missile carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead? There are many who believe that today's bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecule biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable, and unreliable must change. The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be tempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, **as tougher** international **controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking** to acquire chemical and **nuclear weapons, leaders may be** even more **drawn to biological arms as the most accessible form of weapon of mass destruction.** Before beginning a consideration of the implications of molecular biology for biological warfare (BW) and defense, it is worthwhile to briefly review the history of microbiology. It has passed through two eras, and we presently are in its third era. The first was the “pre-Pasteur” era; when the underlying science of fermentation was unknown, so microbiology was applied strictly on an empirical basis. Although undoubtedly any fine beers and wines, as well as breads and other fermented foods, were produced through the use of empirically developed fermentation techniques, no finely controlled production of chemicals was possible. During this era, BW was also empirically based. Common tactics included contaminating water sources with bloated animal carcasses and catapulting infected cadavers into citadels (Poupard and Miller, 1992).

#### Extinction.

**Ochs 2** [Richard, Naturalist – Grand Teton National park with Masters in Natural Resource Management – Rutgers, “Biological Weapons must be abolished immediately” 6-9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html]

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

### TPA

#### No impact – cross-x was pretty conclusive they don’t have a card that trade will collapse – Duedney says that countries have an incentive to keep trading because it is beneficial to them – won’t collapse

**No global economic collapse and it wouldn’t cause conflict**

**Drezner 2011**

(Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 8-12-2011, “Please come down off the ledge, dear readers,” Foreign polivy, <http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/>, CMR)

So, **when we last left off** this debate, **things were looking grim**. My concern in the last post was that the persistence of hard times would cause governments to take actions that would lead to a collapse of the open global economy, a spike in general riots and disturbances, and eerie echoes of the Great Depression. **Let's assume** that **the global economy persists in sputtering for a while**, because that's what happens after major financial shocks. **Why won't** these other **bad things happen? Why isn't it 1931?** Let's start with the obvious -- **it's not gonna be 1931 because there's some passing familiarity with how 1931 played out**. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has devoted much of his academic career to studying the Great Depression. I'm gonna go out on a limb therefore and assert that if the world plunges into a another severe downturn, it's not gonna be because central bank heads replay the same set of mistakes. **The legacy of the Great Depression has also affected public attitudes and institutions that provide much stronger cement for the current system.** In terms of publuc attitudes, compare the results of this mid-2007 poll with this mid-2010 poll about which economic system is best. I'll just reproduce the key charts below: 2007 poll results 2010 poll results The headline of the 2010 results is that there's eroding U.S. support for the global economy, but a few other things stand out. U.S. support has declined, but it's declined from a very high level. In contrast, **support for free markets has increased in other major powers**, such as Germany and China. On the whole, **despite the worst global economic crisis** since the Great Depression, **public attitudes have not changed all that much**. **While there might be populist demands to "do something," that something is not a return to autarky** or anything so drastc. Another big difference is that **multilateral economic institutions are much more robust** now than they were in 1931. On trade matters, even if the Doha round is dead, the rest of **the W**orld **T**rade **O**rganization**'s** **corpus of trade-liberalizing measures are** still **working quite well.** Even beyond the WTO, the complaint about trade is not the deficit of free-trade agreements but the surfeit of them. **The IMF's resources have been strengthened as a result of the 2008 financial crisis**. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has already promulgated a plan to strengthen capital requirements for banks. True, it's a slow, weak-assed plan, but it would be an improvement over the status quo. As for the G-20, I've been pretty skeptical about that group's abilities to collectively address serious macroeconomic problems. That is setting the bar rather high, however. One could argue that **the G-20's most useful function is reassurance**. Even if there are disagreements, **communication can prevent them from growing into anything worse.** Finally, **a note about the possibility of riots and** other **general social unrest.** **The working paper** cited in my previous post **noted the links between austerity measures and increases in disturbances**. However, that paper contains the following important paragraph on page 19**: [I]n countries with better institutions, the responsiveness of unrest to budget cuts is generally lower**. **Where constraints on the executive are minimal, the coefficient on expenditure changes is strongly negative -- more spending buys a lot of social peace. In countries with Polity-2 scores above zero, the coefficient is about half in size, and less significant**. **As we limit the sample to ever more democratic countries, the size of the coefficient declines**. For full democracies with a complete range of civil rights, the coefficient is still negative, but no longer significant. This is good news!! **The world has a hell of a lot more democratic governments now than it did in 1931**. What happened in London, in other words, might prove to be the exception more than the rule. So yes, **the recent economic news might seem grim**. Unless political institutions and public attitudes buckle, **however, we're unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the** 19**30's**. And, based on the data we've got, that's not going to happen.

#### Won’t pass

Hill 12 – 23 (Patrice, 12/23/2013, The Washington Times, “Congress puts Obama on tough road for fast-track trade deals,” Factiva)

President Obama has stepped up efforts to negotiate far-reaching trade deals with Asia and Europe in his second term, but he faces an uphill battle next year in Congress to gain the same authority his predecessors had to finalize such agreements.

Without "fast-track" authority, many trade analysts say, Mr. Obama's hopes to enact trade deals before he leaves office may be doomed. They say longtime opposition to freer trade among congressional Democrats and wariness among some Republicans about giving Mr. Obama such sweeping authority endanger legislation in what could be a cliffhanger vote early next year.

The chairmen of the House and Senate tax-writing committees are negotiating a bipartisan bill to revive fast-track authority, which expired in the seventh year of George W. Bush's presidency.

Fast-track authority restricts Congress to an up-or-down vote on any presidentially negotiated trade agreements with no opportunity to change them. Trade analysts say no other major country would be willing to negotiate concessions if they knew Congress could amend what is considered to be their final deal.

Mr. Obama must navigate difficult political waters to regain fast- track power.

Ralph Nader's Public Citizen group, a leading member of the powerful progressive coalition of labor unions and environmentalists opposed to the legislation, has declared it dead on arrival, based on evidence that at least 25 House Republicans and 151 Democrats will vote against it in the 435-member House, where 218 votes are needed to pass.

As in years past, the president will have to rely heavily on Republicans and a smattering of centrist Democrats to win fast- track authority. But that coalition has been frayed by distrust of Mr. Obama among tea party and other conservative groups - one among many signs that the traditional Republican enthusiasm for free trade is waning among the party's more populist elements.

The fast-track fight is becoming even more urgent as Mr. Obama has entered into two of the most ambitious free trade accords in years: the Trans-Pacific Partnership with 11 other Pacific Rim countries (and possibly two more) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with 28 members of the European Union.

"President Obama must seek to win substantial Republican support" if he hopes to get fast-track authority and win approval of a trans- Pacific trade agreement next year, and he will have to act quickly early in the year, said Scott Miller, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Polls show declining public support for free trade agreements, which can be difficult even for legislators who believe in opening markets. To avoid the pitfalls of election politics, "the president needs to make this issue his own and exert leadership to get the bill enacted before summer 2014, when the election season kicks into high gear," Mr. Miller said.

Asian deal in doubt

The lack of fast-track authority has undermined the administration's effort to secure the Asian trade deal before the end of this year - a goal once espoused by proponents, Mr. Miller said. Other parties to the treaty among nations around the thriving Pacific region - including Vietnam, Canada and Japan - have been wary about making concessions and sensitive trade-offs when Congress could reject, reopen or pick apart the deal under ordinary legislative procedures, Mr. Miller said.

"Given the skepticism of the other parties about the U.S. ability to deliver on its commitments, a final agreement is unlikely" unless Congress first passes Trade Promotion Authority, as the fast-track bill is formally called in Congress, he said.

A defeat of fast-track legislation could deal a debilitating blow to the trans-Pacific deal, which is "at the heart of the administration's rebalancing strategy" toward Asia, and would seriously damage Mr. Obama's second-term trade and diplomatic agenda, Mr. Miller said.

"Beyond the lost economic opportunities, lack of a TPP agreement would feed perceptions in Asia that the rebalance is mainly about military positioning," he said. "It would also raise questions about the U.S. ability to champion the rules of the road in economic affairs."

After giving only tepid support to free trade in his first term, Mr. Obama has embraced fast-track legislation. He hopes to expand trade to support his "pivot to Asia" and to achieve his goals of strengthening the U.S. manufacturing sector and doubling exports. Although exports have been stellar during the economic recovery, growing by 35 percent since the recession and recently exceeding pre- recession levels, they have far from doubled.

Two of Capitol Hill's most powerful free trade advocates, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, Montana Democrat, and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman David Camp, Michigan Republican, promised to push for a fast-track bill early next year, but the effort has been complicated by Mr. Baucus' decision to retire early and become ambassador to China.

"Those of us who fret about the economy can take great comfort in that," said Hank Cox, former president of the National Association of Manufacturers. "The importance of trade to our economy cannot be overstated. The link between trade and economic growth is clear and unmistakable," with every $1 billion of exports generating about 20,000 American jobs, he said.

Mr. Cox acknowledged that the bill faces major obstacles, including declining support for free trade around the world.

"Free trade has always been a hard sell because every nation fears increased competition and the benefits are difficult to quantify," he said. The U.S. historically has led efforts to open trade markets and, "to its credit, the Obama administration recognizes the importance of this legacy."

Now, Congress needs to follow suit, he said.

#### Too many thumpers

House 12 – 16 (Billy, NJ Daily Extra, “'Fast Track' Fight Could Dim Obama Hopes on Trade,” Factiva)

A White House push for congressional approval of “fast track” trade promotion authority is emerging as a key early test next year of President Obama’s already-battered second-term clout on Capitol Hill, with a main obstacle being the majority of his fellow Democrats in the House.

Opposition to such authority exists on the right, too, making it likely that Obama will have to cobble together a coalition of centrist Democrats and pro-business Republicans for passage of legislation giving the president greater autonomy in negotiating trade agreements.

“It’s going to take a fair amount of effort on the president’s part to get it through—a significant amount of arm-twisting with Democrats. That’s his challenge,” said Gary Hufbauer, a trade expert at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

“A lot may depend on how energetically President Obama personally weighs in,” Hufbauer added.

How much of his existing political capital the president will have to expend—or will want to expend—in getting such action through Congress is uncertain coming off the troubled rollout of the health care law and the revolts against his interim deal on Iran and sanctions relief. Obama has said he needs the trade authority, but not nearly as forcefully as he’s talked about immigration reform.

International trade deals must be approved by Congress. But under fast-track authority, lawmakers would only be able to hold up-or-down votes on pacts presented by the administration and would not be able to tinker with the specifics of the deals through amendments or other changes. Such authority is typically seen as essential to ensuring other countries that the terms of an agreement they have reached cannot be renegotiated by Congress.

#### Delay inevitable

Inside US-China Trade 1 – 1 (“Baucus To Be Nominated As Ambassador To China, Wyden To Chair Finance, 1/1/2014, Vol. 14, No. 1, Factiva)

Once Baucus formally retires from the Senate, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR), will take the chairmanship, according to informed sources.

Wyden is taking over as chairman because Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), who is the more senior member on Finance, has declined to assume the chairmanship. Doing so would have required him to give up his chairmanship of the Senate Commerce Committee.

Rockefeller announced in January that he would not seek re-election and would retire when his current term expires at the end of this Congress (Inside U.S. Trade, Jan. 18).

Observers said that Baucus' retirement would very likely delay the effort to advance legislation to renew Trade Promotion Authority early next year.

They also noted that the two senators have very different priorities in trade. Baucus was focused on opening markets for agricultural exports, particularly beef. Wyden has emphasized that an effective trade policy must address the needs of the digital economy and reflect broad public input, effectively enforce U.S. trade laws, and provide Trade Adjustment Assistance for workers and firms. He has said a new fast-track bill should reflect these elements (Inside U.S. Trade, Oct. 11).

**War power losses won’t affect immigration or PC**

Perry **Bacon 9/9**/13, “Losing the Syria vote does not turn Obama into a lame duck”, <http://thegrio.com/2013/09/09/no-losing-the-syria-vote-does-not-turn-obama-into-a-lame-duck/>, CMR

McDonough ducked the question, preferring to focus on the substance of the administration’s case for military action. But to be clear, **no**, **Obama losing** a vote on Syria **does not turn him into a lame duck**.¶ Would the defeat be bad for the president? Of course. Polls show majorities of not only conservatives, who oppose much of what Obama does on every issue, but also liberals and moderates disagree with the president on intervening in Syria. If a vote gets to the House of Representatives, there’s a chance it will be defeated with large blocs of liberals and black members of Congress voting against a president who they have strongly supported for much of the last five years. The White House would have made an all-out blitz to win the support of American voters and Congress and lost.¶ A defeat would show Obama’s words on chemical weapons and perhaps other foreign policy ideas won’t be supported by deeds. It would also illustrate Americans are even more wary of intervention in other nations than was generally believed and likely block Obama from any kind of military action in the future, even the kind of limited steps he took in Libya two years ago.¶ But **the presidency is not one issue, or just about foreign policy**. **If the House or** the **Senate** **blocks** action in **Syria, Republicans still would be wise to back** the **immigration** bill the Senate passed earlier this year, giving Obama a major victory but also making it easier for the GOP to win Latino votes in the future. **House Republicans**, **divided** **internally on that issue**, **have been delaying consideration** of the bill, and **that process is unaffected by what happens on Syria**.¶ The **Obama** administration, **even if it does not act in Syria, will still be implementing** a far-reaching **health care** law that could provide health insurance to millions of Americans. The president will still have the use of the bully pulpit, to make the case against America’s growing income inequality and urge our society to focus more on the specific challenges faced by African-American males, as Obama suggested he would do after the George Zimmerman verdict. **The administration can still fight** controversial voting laws passed in Republican-led states, urge fewer prosecutions of non-violent drug offenders and support the growing American acceptance of gay marriage.¶ And it wasn’t as if Obama’s agenda had been moving quickly through Congress before he starting talking about Syria. Republicans in the Senate had blocked his gun control push, the House delayed the immigration bill and members of both parties were not fully on board with his economic agenda. Before Syria was in the headlines, the administration was planning to spend September pushing for Congress to approve government funding for the next year and raise the federal debt limit, the kind of necessary but unexciting lawmaking that Obama has been limited to since Republicans won control of the House of Representatives in 2010.¶ That’s **the key factor here: Republican control of the House**. **Much speculation has centered on Obama losing his “political capital”** or his ability to influence Congress and the public over the last three years. But **the evidence is fairly clear; Obama has struggled to get legislation through Congress since its membership came to include many more Republicans**, who disagree with him on most issues. If Obama wanted to cut taxes on the wealthy Americans or allow the construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline, both ideas Republicans strongly support, they could easily be passed in Congress.¶ **A loss by Obama** on Syria **won’t change the views of Republicans, who were already against most of what Obama proposed, or congressional Democrats, who won’t suddenly stop supporting** Obamacare or **other presidential initiatives**.¶ **If the president is barred** from attacking Syria by Congress, **that will not be the last real day of his presidency.** The next day will not be the first day of the 2016 campaign, which has long been underway anyway. President George W. **Bush’s poll numbers dropped** quickly **after** his **mishandling** of the aftermath of Hurricane **Katrina**, and **it was considered the end of presidency. But he still managed to implement** a whole **new strategy in Iraq and** **loan billions** of taxpayer dollars **to American banks and auto companies** in his last two years in office — **hardly** the stuff of **a man who was powerless**.¶ **No matter what happens** in Syria, Barack **Obama will still have** more than 1200 days to make **an impact** on American public policy and culture.

**Not intrinsic – do the plan and pass immigration reform**

**Turn: sunk cost – plan frees up capital**

---Executive authorities cost the President political capital during agenda fights – the plan grants Obama freedom from the power trap

Todd **Eberly**, coordinator of Public Policy Studies and assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at St. Mary's College of Maryland, January 21, **2013**. “The presidential power trap,” <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-george-hw-bush-party-support>

**Faced with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal powers**. The number of important executive orders has increased significantly since the 1960s, as have the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents **in an attempt to shape and direct policy on their terms**. Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well, appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to avoid delays and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. **Such power assertions typically elicit close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital**. Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government. **By mid-2011**, Mr. Obama's job approval had slipped well below its initial levels, and Congress was proving increasingly intransigent. **In the face of** declining public support and rising **congressional opposition, Mr. Obama, like his predecessors, looked to the energetic use of executive power. In 2012, the president relied on executive discretion and legal ambiguity** to allow homeowners to more easily refinance federally backed mortgages, to help veterans find employment and to make it easier for college graduates to consolidate federal student loan debt. He issued several executive orders effecting change in the nation's enforcement of existing immigration laws. He used an executive order to authorize the Department of Education to grant states waivers from the requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act — though the enacting legislation makes no accommodation for such waivers. Contrary to the outcry from partisan opponents, Mr. Obama's actions were hardly unprecedented or imperial. Rather, they represented a rather typical power assertion from a contemporary president. Many looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present trends. But Barack Obama's narrow re-election victory, coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and Democratic majority Senate, hardly signals a grand resurgence of his political capital. The president's recent issuance of multiple executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of his power trap. **Faced with the likelihood of legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely on claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit or cost and will likely further erode his political capital**. Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president likely to avoid a power trap. Presidents in recent years have been unable to prevent their political capital from eroding. When it did, their power assertions often got them into further political trouble. Through leveraging public support, presidents have at times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the public already supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W. Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure important policy changes — in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts and education reform — that at the time received popular approval. However, **short-term legislative strategies may win policy success for a president but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital** over time, as the difficult final years of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack Obama's recent predecessors solved the political capital problem or avoided **the power trap**. It **is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents** and one that will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office.

**Fiat solves the link — it’s instant — no political effect – most logical because congress is the agent of the resolution this year**

**---Plan splits the GOP**

**Corn 13** – David Corn, Reporter at Mother Jones, "Obama, Syria, and Congress: Why Did He Go There?", Mother Jones, 9-6, <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/09/why-obama-sought-congressional-authorization-syria>, CMR

**With his decision to seek congressional approval** for an attack, **Obama created a political whirlpool**. **He exacerbated the growing schism on the right that pits tea party isolationists**—led by possible presidential candidate Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), with Sens. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), other likely 2016ers, rushing to catch up—**versus** the coalition of **hawks** commanded by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and neocons who yearn for a deeper and larger intervention in Syria than the president envisions. **This** split **has the potential to turn into an ideological civil war within the GOP** during the next presidential campaign. Meanwhile, **House Republicans are deeply divided** (unlike during the run-up to the Iraq war), with Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) and his leadership crew on the president's side and rank-and-file House GOPers, enwrapped in Obama hatred, accusing the president of misleading the world and engaging in conspiratorial warmongering.

**---Key to the agenda**

**Dickerson 13** (John, Slate, Go for the Throat21, 1/18, [www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/politics/2013/01/barack\_obama\_s\_second\_inaugural\_address\_the\_president\_should\_declare\_war.single.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/01/barack_obama_s_second_inaugural_address_the_president_should_declare_war.single.html), CMR)

On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. It would be altogether fitting if he stepped to the microphone, looked down the mall, and let out a sigh: so many people expecting so much from a government that appears capable of so little. A second inaugural suggests new beginnings, but this one is being bookended by dead-end debates. **Gridlock** over the fiscal cliff **preceded** it and **gridlock** over the debt limit, sequester, and budget will follow. After the election, **the same people are in power in all the branches of government and they don't get along. There's no indication that** the president's **clashes with** House Republicans **will end soon**. Inaugural speeches are supposed to be huge and stirring. Presidents haul our heroes onstage, from George Washington to Martin Luther King Jr. George W. Bush brought the Liberty Bell. They use history to make greatness and achievements seem like something you can just take down from the shelf. Americans are not stuck in the rut of the day. But this might be too much for Obama’s second inaugural address: After the last four years, how do you call the nation and its elected representatives to common action while standing on the steps of a building where collective action goes to die? That bipartisan bag of tricks has been tried and it didn’t work. People don’t believe it. Congress' approval rating is 14 percent, the lowest in history. In a December Gallup poll, 77 percent of those asked said the way Washington works is doing “serious harm” to the country. **The challenge for** President **Obama’s** speech is the challenge of his **second term: how to be great when the environment stinks. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires** something **more than** simply the clever application of **predictable stratagems**. Washington’s **partisan rancor**, the size of the problems facing government, **and the limited amount of time before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: The president** who came into office speaking in lofty terms about bipartisanship and cooperation **can only cement his legacy if he destroys the GOP**. If he wants to transform American politics, **he must go for the throat**. President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker. How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack **Obama** of the first administration **might have approached the task by finding** some **Republicans to deal with and** then start agreeing to some of their demands in hope that he would **win some of their votes**. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more schmoozing with lawmakers, too. **That's the old way. He has abandoned that.** **He doesn't think it will work** and **he doesn't have the time.** As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the **Republicans are dead set on opposing him**. **They cannot be unchained by schmoozing**. **Even if Obama were wrong about Republican intransigence, other constraints will limit the chance for cooperation**. **Republican lawmakers worried about primary challenges** in 2014 **are not going to be willing partners.** He probably has at most 18 months before people start dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name. **Obama’s only remaining option is to pulverize**. Whether he succeeds in passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. **Through a series of clarifying fights over controversial issues, he can force Republicans to** either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or **cause a rift in the party that will leave it**, at least temporarily, **in disarray**.

***Ideology outweighs* and *no spillover***

**Edwards 3** – George C. Edwards, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A26M University and Former Director of the Center for Presidential Studies, "Riding High in the Polls: George W. Bush and Public Opinion", [www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF-http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF](http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF-http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF), CMR

**Passing legislation** **was** **even more difficult on** the **divisive domestic issues** that¶ remained on Congress’s agenda, including health care, environmental protection, energy,¶ the economy, the faith-based initiative, corporate malfeasance, judicial nominees, and¶ taxes. The **politics of the war on terrorism did not fundamentally alter** the **consideration of**¶ **these issues,** which continued to divide the public and their representatives in Congress as¶ they had before. The **inevitable differences** between the parties **emerged** predictably,¶ exacerbated by the narrow majorities in each chamber and the jockeying for advantage in¶ the midterm elections.¶ Bipartisanship **in** **one arena** (the war on terrorism) **does not** necessarily **carry over**¶ **in another**. As the parties in Congress have become more homogeneous over time and as¶ the number of competitive seats has shrunk, especially in the House, the differences¶ between the parties have increased. The opposition party is not very fertile ground for¶ presidents on most issues – even during wartime. Thus, the president failed to obtain¶ many of his priority items in 2002, including making the 2001 tax cuts permanent and¶ passing his fiscal stimulus program, a robust faith-based initiative, and drilling rights in the¶ Artic National Wildlife Reserve. No progress was made on partially privatizing Social¶ Security, banning cloning and certain kinds of abortion, and passing private-school tax¶ credits, and the president experienced plenty of frustration on obtaining confirmation of¶ his judicial appointees. He also had to sign a farm bill that was much more costly than he¶ wanted.¶ In December 2001, the president concluded quiet negotiations with the Democrats¶ led by Senator Edward Kennedy and signed a bill on education reform. The president was¶ able to claim a victory on one of his priority issues, even though he had to give up many of¶ the most controversial elements of his original proposal. It is significant that to¶ accomplish even this much, the president chose to stay private rather than go public.¶ The modest impact of Bush’s approval is not surprising. **The president’s** public¶ **support must compete for influence with other**, **more stable factors that affect voting in**¶ **Congress, including ideology, party, personal views and commitments on specific policies,**¶ **and constituency interests.** **Although constituency interests may seem to overlap with**¶ **presidential approval, they should be viewed as distinct**. **It is quite possible for**¶ **constituents to approve of the president but oppose him on particular policies**, and it is¶ opinions on these policies that will ring most loudly in congressional ears. **Members of**¶ **Congress are unlikely to vote against the clear interests of their constituents or the firm**¶ **tenets of their ideology solely in deference to a widely supported chief executive**.45

**Obama won’t push, dodges fights**

Jack **Goldsmith 13**, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, Feb 13 2013, "The President’s SOTU Pledge to Work With Congress and Be Transparent on National Security Issues," [www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/the-presidents-sotu-pledge-to-work-with-congress-and-be-transparent-on-national-security-issues/](http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/the-presidents-sotu-pledge-to-work-with-congress-and-be-transparent-on-national-security-issues/) CMR

**As for a broader and sturdier congressional framework** for the administration’s growing forms of secret war (not just targeted killing, but special forces activities around the globe, cyber attacks, modern forms of covert action, etc.) along the lines that I proposed last week, I also don’t think much will happen. **Friends and acquaintances** in and **around** the **Obama** administration **told me** they would cherish such a new statutory framework, but argued that **Congress is too political**, and executive-congressional relations too poisonous, **for** **anything** like this **to happen**. There is some truth in this charge, although I sense that Congress is preparing to work more constructively on these issues. But even in the face of a very political and generally unsupportive Congress, Presidents tend to get what they want in national security when they make the case publicly and relentlessly. (Compare the Bush administration’s successful push for FISA reform in the summer of 2008, when the President’s approval ratings were below 30%, and Democrats controlled both houses of Congress; or FDR’s push in late 1940 and early 1941 – against popular and congressional opposition – to secure enactment of Lend-Lease legislation to help to British fend off the Nazis; or the recent FISA renewal legislation.) And of course the administration can never succeed if it doesn’t try hard. Not fighting the fight for national security legal reform is just another way of saying that **the matter is not important enough to the administration to warrant a fight**. **The administration’s failure to** date to **make a sustained push** before Congress **on these issues reveals a preference for reliance on** ever-more-tenuous **old authorities** and secret executive branch interpretations in areas ranging from drones to cyber, **and a**n implicit **judgment that the political** and legal **advantages** that would flow **from a national debate** and refreshed and clarified authorities **are** simply **not worth the effort**. The administration might be right in this judgment, at least for itself in the short run. But the President has now pledged something different in his SOTU address. We will see if he follows through this time. Count me as skeptical, but hopeful that I am wrong.

## 1AR

### CP

#### Counterplan is automatically conditioned on giving up enrichment – means they’ll say no

Bunn and McGoldrick 12-31

[Matthew, professor at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, was an advisor on nonproliferation in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy from 1994 to 1996. Fred McGoldrick held senior positions in the Departments of Energy and State from 1973 to 1998, where he negotiated U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements and helped shape U.S. policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, “A nuclear blind alley for the U.S.”, <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/commentary/la-oe-bunn-nuclear-proliferation-20131231,0,184022.story#ixzz2pRsOIV1W>]

The world is rightly worried about Iran’s uranium enrichment programme. Iran claims this technology is for producing fuel for nuclear power plants, but it could be quickly shifted to making nuclear bomb material. Unfortunately, some in Congress, in their eagerness to stem the spread of such technologies, have introduced legislation — separate from their effort to slap further sanctions on Iran — that probably would make stopping nuclear proliferation harder, not easier. Their idea is to limit future US peaceful nuclear cooperation only to countries that make a legal commitment to forgo building facilities for either uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing (the other path to nuclear bomb material). The idea sounds good, but it is likely to be both ineffective and counterproductive. Why? First, all but a few countries are likely to reject making such a commitment, signing away what they consider to be their rights under the (NPT) Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Getting into an argument over national sovereignty and national rights would make it very difficult or impossible to discuss practical steps that countries might otherwise take to meet their nuclear fuel needs. A few countries have been prepared to agree to such terms, but they are unique cases. The UAE realised that as the first Arab country to build nuclear power plants, it had to go the extra mile to address international concerns. It signed every nonproliferation commitment available, including a ban on enrichment and reprocessing. Although some call the UAE’s 2009 agreement with the US the “gold standard,” the reality is that few other countries would agree to similar terms. (Taiwan, which has also accepted those terms, is unusually dependent on the US and agreed under US pressure.) Although the recent interim nuclear deal with Iran is a positive step, having acknowledged that enrichment will continue in Iran will certainly make it more difficult to insist that America’s nuclear cooperation partners can never be allowed to do the same.

## Prolif

### 2NC Framing / Overview

#### The risk of their offense is really slim

**Sechser 8**—assist. prof, pol sci, UVA. PhD, pol sci, Stanford (Todd, The Stabilizing Effects of Nuclear Proliferation, http://faculty.virginia.edu/tsechser/Sechser-Haas-2009.pdf)

A final objection to this critique holds that the nuclear age has not yet provided enough data to test theories of proliferation. In other words, it is simply too early to evaluate the theories’ predictions (see Sagan 1993, 12). This argument is unpersuasive. The nuclear age is now more than sixty years old, and more than a dozen nations have possessed nuclear weapons at one time or another. If we imagine that every operational nuclear warhead in existence provides, say, one “disaster opportunity” per year, then since 1945 **there have been** nearly **two million opportunities** for an accidental explosion**,** preemptive nuclear strike, nuclear terrorist attack, or preventive war against an emerging proliferator. At the very least, the fact that none of these scenarios has yet occurred should suggest that **the risk is low enough to warrant a** plausible **costbenefit case against** universal **nonproliferation**. Of course, the absence of a nuclear catastrophe to date does not “prove” that proliferation pessimism is wrong. But it is important that we recognize the sharp limits to the inferential leverage that near-misses provide. Each year that passes without a preemptive nuclear attack, preventive war against an aspiring nuclear power, nuclear accident, or act of nuclear terrorism must cast additional doubt on the theory. Ultimately, proliferation pessimism remains burdened by the contrast between the ubiquity of organizational pathologies and the absence of the disastrous nuclear outcomes it expects them to cause. This gap should make us skeptical of its claims.

#### Their one percent framing is flawed

**Sechser 5—**Todd Sechser, Assistant Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, April 7, 2005, How Organizational Pathologies Could Make Nuclear Proliferation Safer, <http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/8/4/9/1/p84918_index.html?type=info&PHPSESSID=7be2c602236d1ae8317a4375fd2608c2>

A second counterargument to the optimist position is the claim that even if proliferation optimism enjoys greater theoretical tenability than previously thought, this does not make its position practically viable. Betts (1999: 65-66) writes that policy makers “do not marvel at all the cases where nuclear weapons will make the world safer, but worry about the exceptions where things will go wrong. . . one exception to the rule may be too many.”13 Likewise, Feaver (1993: 162) argues that even 99.5% prognostic accuracy would be insufficient for proliferation optimism to mount a persuasive case: “At best, rational deterrence theory can predict that nuclear deterrence should assure peace most of the time. Most is not all.” And Sagan (2003b: 184) contends that until military organizations are “perfect,” there is sufficient reason to be pessimistic about the effects of proliferation.14 As long as there is a chance that proliferation might entail some negative effects, the argument holds, then why not play it safe? **This staggering burden of proof is flawed** for two reasons. First, obscures the cost-benefit analysis inherent in any policy deliberation. The appropriate question is not whether the spread of nuclear weapons will result in any nuclear disasters, but whether a world with proliferation would on balance be more peaceful and more stable than a world without it. The issue is whether the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs. If one believes, for example, that nuclear proliferation would eventually result in a preventive war somewhere but that it would also deter numerous conventional wars, then the net overall benefit might justify a more relaxed nonproliferation policy. **Second, the argument obscures the fact that proliferation pessimism** to date **does not possess a “99.5%” record of accuracy – rather, its record stands at 100%.** Of course, the absence of nuclear catastrophe in the past does not assure its absence in the future. But theories ultimately aim to predict outcomes, and despite unearthing a trove of nuclear near-misses, the theory of proliferation pessimism has not succeeded in accomplishing this task. Existing research has successfully shown that the theory’s predicted causal mechanisms have operated in organizations that handle nu-clear weapons, but this is not the same as showing that these mechanisms generate the theory’s predicted outcomes. Even a major counterforce strike against a new nuclear power would not immediately vindicate pessimism – at least not until case study researchers were able to show that the causal mechanisms they specified (that is, preventive war pressures triggered by military biases) were indeed in operation.

### A2 Bioweapons D

#### New tech will ease delivery, increase bioweapon lethality—experts agree

Judith Miller, contributing editor, "Bioterrorism's Deadly Math," CITY JOURNAL, Fall 2008, pp. 53-61.

The challenge grows larger each day as the biotech revolution spreads skills and knowledge around the globe. Margaret Hamburg, a physician who served in senior health posts in the federal government and in New York City, calls the explosion of biotechnology "frightening." In a speech last September, she speculated on a variety of weapons, some already existent and others still being researched, that foes might deploy one day: aerosol technology to deliver infectious agents more efficiently into the lungs; gene therapy vectors that could cause a permanent change in an infected person's genetic makeup; "stealth" viruses that could lie dormant in victims until triggered; and biological agents intentionally engineered to be resistant to available antibiotics or evade immune response.

#### Bioattack risks extinction—outweighs nuclear war

Anders Sandberg et al., James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, "How Can We Reduce the Risk of Human Extinction?" BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 9-9-08, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction, accessed 5-2-10.

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

### Indopak

#### No chance it goes nuclear – most qualled ev

Enders 2 (Jan 30, David, Michigan Daily, “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,” http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely, CMR)

\* Ashutosh Varshney – Professor of Political Science and South Asia expert at the University of Michigan

\* Paul Huth – Professor of International Conflict and Security Affairs at the University of Maryland

\* Kenneth Lieberthal – Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council

University political science Prof. Ashutosh **Varshney** becomes animated **when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between India and Pakistan.¶ "Odds are** close to zero**," Varshney said forcefully**, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "**The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted."¶** The worlds two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous.¶ "**The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said.**¶ "Watching **the evening news**, CNN, I think they **have** vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul **Huth said.¶ Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war. MARK¶ "India is committed to** a **n**o-**f**irst-**s**trikepolicy**," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to** go for a **first strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous."¶** Political science Prof. Kenneth **Lieberthal,** a former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, **agreed**. "Usually a country that is in the position that **Pakistan** is in **would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction,**" Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal.¶ "**American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since September 11, it is that** the command control system has strengthened. **The trigger is in very safe hands."**

### Saudi

#### Claims of Saudi proliferation are all posturing – they have neither the capacity or the will to get nukes

**Jacobs 2011**

[Joshua, Gulf Policy Analyst at the Institute for Gulf Affairs, “Saudi's Bluff on the Bomb”, July 19, http://www.gulfinstitute.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=176:saudis-bluff-on-the-bomb&catid=16:news&Itemid=1]

Saudi Arabia set off alarm bells in Western capitals earlier this week when transcripts of a speech Prince Turki al-Faisal gave to senior NATO military officials were released. Prince Turki stated that an Iranian nuclear weapons program “would compel Saudi Arabia to pursue policies which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences;” or in other words a Saudi nuclear weapon. The West’s alarm reached a fever pitch when an undisclosed senior official in Riyadh elaborated by saying only that “If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit.” Almost immediately, analysts scrambled to publish pieces on how such a feat could be accomplished, what the implications might be, and of course what the Western response would be. This atmosphere of acute fear is exactly the reaction Riyadh desires, because in reality they have absolutely no intention of beginning a nuclear weapons program. The decision to release these statements comes at time when Saudi Arabia feels as though the strategic ground is collapsing around them. They perceive their chief enemy, Iran, to be gaining at their expense. In the past year they have suffered a series of tremendous blows to their position in the region. In Egypt they lost a major ally with the fall of Hosni Mubarak, and the new government quickly moved to re-establish relations with Iran. To the south in Yemen, the disintegration of the Saleh regime threatens to spread disorder to Saudi territory and signals the loss of another allied regime. This is compounded by the rise of a democratic Shia-majority Iraq to their north, and the uprising in Bahrain; which to Saudi Arabia has shades of Iranian involvement. It is no wonder that Saudi Arabia is desperate to try and realign the scales, and dropping the prospect of a Saudi bomb is certainly one way to do so. By indicating that Saudi Arabia might pursue a nuclear weapons program to match an Iranian bomb, the Saudis clearly intend to refocus Western attention and change the current narrative on the Middle East. For a few months the Arab Spring has diverted the focus from Iran, instead shining the light on US and Western allies. Calling for nuclear parity with Iran not only shifts attention to the Iranian nuclear weapons program but raises the specter of nuclear proliferation in the region. Not only is this an effective strategy; it is an old one. Saudi Arabia has leaked statements or policy papers on a possible nuclear weapons program consistently since 2003 as a way to prod the West into action. However, the threat is empty; the likelihood that Saudi Arabia will pursue an active nuclear weapons program is incredibly minute MARK. First of all, what the Kingdom stands to gain from pursuing such a program should be considered. It is almost a certainty that an Iranian nuclear weapon would result in a US nuclear umbrella for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. This would be in addition to copious increases in conventional military arms sales and the stationing of more US assets in the region to secure the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of a weapons program risks alienating all of their major Western allies and pushing away their much cherished security guarantee. Finally, the sheer scale of development needed for such a program must be considered. Even for a wealthy state such as Saudi Arabia the challenges are daunting. Saudi Arabia has only just begun to create a nuclear energy program, with the first reactors not yet even online. The jump from the conceptual planning of nuclear power plants to the actual development of a weapons program is huge and would likely consume hundreds of billions of dollars and years of development.

### A2 Multipolar Worse

#### This applies to conventional conflict more. The relevance of small changes in the balance of power is greater under conventional buildups, but prolif solves

**Waltz 95** (Kenneth, Prof. Emeritus of Pol. Sci – UC Berkeley, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate”, p. 14)

Fourth, while some worry about nuclear states coming in hostile pairs, others worry that they won't come in hostile pairs. The simplicity of relations that obtains when one party has to concentrate its worry on only one other, and the ease of calculating forces and estimating the dangers they pose, may be lost. Early in the Cold War, the United States deterred the Soviet Union, and in due course, the Soviet Union deterred the United States. As soon as additional states joined the nuclear club, however, the question of who deterred whom could no longer be easily answered. The Soviet Union had to worry lest a move made in Europe might cause France and Britain to retaliate, thus possibly setting off American forces as well. Such worries at once complicated calculations and **strengthened deterrence**. Somebody might have retaliated, and that was all a would-be attacker needed to know. Nuclear weapons restore the clarity and simplicity lost as bipolar situations are replaced by multipolar ones.

### Nuke Terror D

#### 1AC indicted Robock

#### They’ll go to Russia

**Allison 8** (Graham, Dir. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs – Harvard U. Kennedy School of Government, Washington Times, “Preventing a nuclear terrorist attack”, 3-30, L/N)

3. Where could terrorists acquire a nuclear bomb? If a nuclear attack occurs, Russia will be the most likely source of the weapon or material. Russia has more nuclear weapons and materials than any other country, much of it still vulnerable to theft. A close second would be North Korea.

#### NO IMPACT TO TERROR – multiple warrants

**Gavin 10, Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin**

Francis J.. "Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War." International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 7-37.

The possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States is widely believed to be a grave, even apocalyptic, threat and a likely possibility, a belief supported by numerous statements by public officials. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, “the inevitability of the spread of nuclear terrorism” and of a “successful terrorist attack” have been taken for granted.48 Coherent policies to reduce the risk of a nonstate actor using nuclear weapons clearly need to be developed. In particular, the rise of the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear technology network should give pause.49 But again, the news is not as grim as nuclear alarmists would suggest. Much has already been done to secure the supply of nuclear materials, and relatively simple steps can produce further improvements. Moreover, there are reasons to doubt both the capabilities and even the interest many terrorist groups have in detonating a nuclear device on U.S. soil. As Adam Garfinkle writes, “The threat of nuclear terrorism is very remote.”50 Experts disagree on whether nonstate actors have the scientific, engineering, financial, natural resource, security, and logistical capacities to build a nuclear bomb from scratch. According to terrorism expert Robin Frost, the danger of a “nuclear black market” and loose nukes from Russia may be overstated. Even if a terrorist group did acquire a nuclear weapon, delivering and detonating it against a U.S. target would present tremendous technical and logistical difficulties.51 Finally, the feared nexus between terrorists and rogue regimes may be exaggerated. MARK As nuclear proliferation expert Joseph Cirincione argues, states such as Iran and North Korea are “not the most likely sources for terrorists since their stockpiles, if any, are small and exceedingly precious, and hence well-guarded.”52 Chubin states that there “is no reason to believe that Iran today, any more than Sadaam Hussein earlier, would transfer WMD [weapons of mass destruction] technology to terrorist groups like al-Qaida or Hezbollah.”53 Even if a terrorist group were to acquire a nuclear device, expert Michael Levi demonstrates that effective planning can prevent catastrophe: for nuclear terrorists, what “can go wrong might go wrong, and when it comes to nuclear terrorism, a broader, integrated defense, just like controls at the source of weapons and materials, can multiply, intensify, and compound the possibilities of terrorist failure, possibly driving terrorist groups to reject nuclear terrorism altogether.” Warning of the danger of a terrorist acquiring a nuclear weapon, most analyses are based on the inaccurate image of an “infallible tenfoot- tall enemy.” This type of alarmism, writes Levi, impedes the development of thoughtful strategies that could deter, prevent, or mitigate a terrorist attack: “Worst-case estimates have their place, but the possible failure-averse, conservative, resource-limited five-foot-tall nuclear terrorist, who is subject not only to the laws of physics but also to Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism, needs to become just as central to our evaluations of strategies.”54 A recent study contends that al-Qaida’s interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons may be overstated. Anne Stenersen, a terrorism expert, claims that “looking at statements and activities at various levels within the al-Qaida network, it becomes clear that the network’s interest in using unconventional means is in fact much lower than commonly thought.”55 She further states that “CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] weapons do not play a central part in al-Qaida’s strategy.”56 In the 1990s, members of al-Qaida debated whether to obtain a nuclear device. Those in favor sought the weapons primarily to deter a U.S. attack on al-Qaida’s bases in Afghanistan. This assessment reveals an organization at odds with that laid out by nuclear alarmists of terrorists obsessed with using nuclear weapons against the United States regardless of the consequences. Stenersen asserts, “Although there have been various reports stating that al-Qaida attempted to buy nuclear material in the nineties, and possibly recruited skilled scientists, it appears that al-Qaida central have not dedicated a lot of time or effort to developing a high-end CBRN capability. . . . Al-Qaida central never had a coherent strategy to obtain CBRN: instead, its members were divided on the issue, and there was an awareness that militarily effective weapons were extremely difficult to obtain.” 57 Most terrorist groups “assess nuclear terrorism through the lens of their political goals and may judge that it does not advance their interests.”58 As Frost has written, “The risk of nuclear terrorism, especially true nuclear terrorism employing bombs powered by nuclear fission, is overstated, and that popular wisdom on the topic is significantly flawed.”59